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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE  
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



WHERE HAVE ALL THE JOINT PLANNERS GONE?

by

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Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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April 2009

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## **Abstract**

Joint Staff leadership identified a need for skilled joint planners both within the Joint Staff and at the various Combatant Command (COCOM) Headquarters. Although each of the Services previously developed their own respective planner producing schools, the Joint Staff modified existing joint education capacities to develop a unique joint planner school that would satisfy their needs and the needs of the ten COCOMs.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) is the Joint Staff's answer to the need for skilled joint planners within the military's highest levels of joint command. Established in 2004 as a single-phase, 11-month, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) I and II school, the class consists of military officers in the grades of O4-O6, allied officers, and interagency personnel, currently with an annual class size of 41 students.

Upon graduation, each of the Services are expected to assign their respective JAWS graduates to planning positions within the Joint Staff or the various COCOMs. Due to officer management demands, trend analysis from the first four graduating classes indicates that the services are not outplacing graduates as per original expectations. Each year, fewer and fewer graduates assume joint planning positions and the COCOMs are forced to fill joint planner billets with contractors, reservists, or even non-skilled planners. Only a holistic approach, with full support from the Services to select and outplace JAWS graduates, will ensure skilled joint planners fulfill billets on the Joint Staff and within the COCOMs. While current policies allow the Services greater latitude in officer management, they also fail to resource the COCOMS and Joint Staff with skilled joint planners.

## Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	1
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	2
Definition of Terms.....	4
Scope of Paper.....	5
Chapter Breakdown.....	6
Chapter 2 The Need for Advanced Warfighting Schools (AWS).....	9
Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).....	14
Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW).....	16
Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS).....	17
Navy Operational Planner Course (NOPC).....	18
Army Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF).....	20
Advanced Warfighting School Summary.....	21
Chapter 3 The Need for a Joint Advanced Warfighting School.....	22
Development of JAWS.....	25
JAWS Today.....	30
Chapter 4 Legislation and the Current Environment.....	36
Chapter 5 Processes Defined by the Services.....	42
Army Process.....	43
Navy Process.....	49
Air Force Process.....	51
Marine Corps Process.....	53
4 Services, 4 Methods.....	54
Chapter 6 JAWS Outplacement Assessment.....	56
COCOM Feedback.....	61
Chapter 7 Proposed Remedies.....	64
Chapter 8 Recommendations and the Way Ahead.....	74
Bibliography.....	79

“Perseverance is a great element of success. If you only knock long enough and loud enough at the gate, you are sure to wake up somebody.”

- Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In early 2003, Joint Staff leadership directed the development of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) to satisfy a need for skilled joint planners within the highest joint military headquarters. The Joint Staff envisioned that each of the Services would annually select officers with potential to serve as joint planners within the Joint Staff or COCOM staffs. Selected officers would then attend an 11-month joint school to focus on three interrelated fields of study: Foundations in the History and Theory of War, Strategic Foundations, and Operational Art and Campaigning. Ultimately, these officers would create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, and succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners. Upon graduation, the Services would then assign these officers to joint planning billets within the Joint Staff or COCOM Staffs where they would be able to apply the joint planner skills learned in the previous year.

Although the Joint Staff vision for the JAWS program seems simple as stated, further analysis identifies that the Services are not achieving the Joint Staff desired endstate, namely, populating the Joint Staff and COCOMs with skilled joint planners. Analysis shows that the Services assigned the largest percentage of JAWS graduates (72%) to Joint Staff/ COCOM planner billets with the first graduating class in summer 2005. Since the first graduating class, Services continually assigned fewer graduates to

Joint Staff/COCOM planner billets in subsequent years with only 24% of graduates assuming Joint Staff/COCOM planner billets with the most recent graduating class in summer 2008.

This paper provides an argument as to why the Service's outplacement of JAWS graduates to joint planner billets continues to decline annually in spite of specific guidance from the Joint Staff to the Services to ensure graduates assume joint planner roles at either the Joint Staff or COCOM staffs. Although each of the Services maintain their own respective "planner" schools, these schools fail to educate officers to fulfill the planning needs commensurate with duties within the Joint Staff and at the COCOM level. This paper supports the argument that specially trained planners, a product of the JAWS curriculum, are necessary within the Joint Staff and COCOM staffs. Since policy directives to emplace JAWS graduates into joint planner billets do not currently exist, the Services fail to effectively resource joint planner needs. In essence, populations of specially trained planners, as a resource, are annually mismanaged at a loss to the needs of the Joint Staff and COCOM staffs.

Only a holistic approach, with full support from the Services to select and outplace JAWS graduates, will ensure skilled joint planners fulfill billets on the Joint Staff and within the COCOMS. Although Department of Defense (DOD) and Joint Staff policies allow for Service latitude in regards to officer management, this same latitude also hinders the marriage of skilled joint planners to required joint planner positions. The current path, uncorrected, diminishes the planning capability at our Nation's highest joint headquarters. In order to compensate for these planner shortages, the COCOMs are

forced to fill required planner billets with contractors, reservists, or even with non-skilled planners.

### **Definition of Terms**

Each of the Services relies on a different lexicon when referring to a number of the topics within this paper. In an attempt to develop some clarity from the mix of service terminology, some common definitions follow:

- 1) Advanced Warfighting School (AWS): A program designed to produce military planners above and beyond the curriculum presented at traditional schools within the Professional Military Education model, usually beginning immediately following or in-lieu of Intermediate Level Education. The Navy does not differ in terminology but the Air Force refers to graduates of these programs as Advanced Studies Graduates (ASG), the Army refers to these programs as Advanced Military Studies Programs (AMSP), and the Marines reference the term Advanced Intermediate Level Schools (AILS).
- 2) Outplacement: The assignment of AWS students after graduation or completion of their studies. The Joint Staff, J1 uses the term outplacement as well.
- 3) Intermediate Level Education (ILE): Defined as Professional Military Education for O4s (Majors or Lieutenant Commanders) within their respective services.
- 4) Senior Level Educations (SLE): Defined as Professional Military Education for select O5s (Lieutenant Colonels or Commanders) and O6s (Colonels or Captains) within their respective services.

### Scope of the Paper

This paper focuses solely on the outplacement of active duty military JAWS graduates and does not include National Guard or Reserve component graduates. By summer 2009, JAWS will graduate its 125<sup>th</sup> military graduate of the active force. Only those active force Soldiers, Sailors, Airman, and Marines that have actually graduated (classes 1-4, thru Summer 2008) are included in the statistical analysis identified in later chapters, which equates to approximately 25 graduates per academic year for a total of 101 graduates. The Services manage their respective National Guard and Reservists differently for AWS outplacement and for the sake of clarity are beyond the scope of this paper. The highlighted area represents the current class (Class 05) and which is also not included in the outplacement analysis for this paper.

### JAWS Graduates by Year

Since inception

	2004-2005 Class 01	2005-2006 Class 02	2006-2007 Class 03	2007-2008 Class 04	2008-2009 Class 05	Totals By Component
USA	8	8	9 (1 x ARNG)	11 (1 x ARNG) (1 x USAR)	11 (1 x ARNG) (1 x USAR)	47 (3 x ARNG) (2 x USAR)
USAF	9	8	9	11 (1 x USAFR) (2 x USANG)	11 (1 x USAFR) (1 x USANG)	48 (2 x USAFR) (3 x USANG)
USN	6	6	7	6	6 (2 x USNR)	31 (2 x USNR)
USMC	2	3	3 (1 x USMCR)	3 (1 x USMCR)	3 (1 x USCMR)	14 (3 x USCMR)
Interagency*	0	4	6	8	8	26
International	0	0	2 (UK)	2 (UK)	2 (UK)	6 (UK)
Class Totals (Active Military)	25 (25)	29 (25)	36 (26)	41 (25)	41 (24)	Overall Total 172

Interagency includes: Department of Homeland Security (4), Defense Intelligence Agency (3), Department of Defense (3), National Security Agency (5), Department of State (7), U.S. Coast Guard (3), and Joint Transformation Command for Intelligence (1)



Additionally, although a sizeable portion of the JAWS graduates are from the interagency (26 collectively since inception), the Joint Staff does not have the ability to influence the outplacement of these graduates. Interagency graduates have different outplacement requirements, depending on their respective parent agency. These assignments do not necessarily support the needs of the Joint Staff or the COCOMs and inclusion of interagency data would detract from the main argument, the successful outplacement of military graduates, and is not within the scope of this paper. This same logic applies to the six international students, where the United Kingdom will ultimately defines their own JAWS graduate outplacement policies and requirements.

The majority of the information collected for this paper was collected from personal interviews, phone conversations, and emails with the author. All persons cited as a reference from these interviews and emails authorized their views for inclusion in this paper. Where non-attribution was an absolute necessity, names were omitted from the referenced citations.

### **Chapter Breakdown**

Chapters 2 and 3 provide background and history of Advanced Warfighting Schools. These chapters examine the needs for specialized planner education and indicate the levels of selection and outplacement to maximize Service investment into Advanced Warfighting Schools. Although each of the Services successfully developed schools to satisfy their own respective planning needs, none of the schools provides the scope afforded by the JAWS curriculum for joint planners. Chapter 3 further focuses on the development of JAWS to capture the best attributes of the Service Advanced Warfighting Schools. The JAWS visionaries and course designers tailored the JAWS curriculum to

produce joint planners able to operate at the highest levels of military command and within the whole of government.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide insight into the nexus of Joint Professional Military Education and Joint Officer Management. Although the JAWS curriculum satisfies the educational vision to successfully produce joint planners, lack of an effective joint officer management policy hinders the full vision of JAWS for graduates to populate the Joint Staff and COCOM staffs. Each of the Services developed their own selection and outplacement criteria for JAWS graduates. Chapter 5 provides the details on these very different processes to select and outplace JAWS graduates. The processes not only differ between each of the Services but also differ depending on the level of education a graduate completes within their own service. All of the different methods confuse the problem and complicate a holistic solution.

Chapter 6 identifies the outplacement trends of the first 101 active duty military graduates. This chapter also provides non-attributional feedback from the “customers” –the ten COCOMS- who receive the JAWS “product”. Through surveys, COCOM representatives relate their expectations and desires in regards to JAWS graduates, as well as their frustrations with the Joint Officer Management system and the current Service failures to assign JAWS graduates to joint planner billets.

Chapter 7 and 8 identify current proposals within the Joint Staff to resolve JAWS outplacement issues. These chapters provide analysis of the proposed solutions and indicate shortcomings in the current attempts to provide a holistic solution. Chapter 8 provides final recommendations to better resource the Joint Staff and COCOMs with joint planners.

JAWS satisfies a real need within the joint community. It is an exceptional curriculum with relevant instruction that, if supported by an improved apportionment of graduates, will ensure the Joint Staff and COCOMS receive an annual flow of gifted and talented officers that “are expert in joint campaign planning and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations; capable of integrating existing and emerging capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish operational or strategic objectives.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Forces Staff College, Schools and Academic Programs, “Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS)”, [http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools\\_programs/jaws/](http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/) (accessed 2 February 2009)

“Not satisfied that we were thinking creatively enough, I sent a message in early September to the Army requesting a fresh team of planners. A four-man team of graduates from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the elite year-long program at Command and General Staff College that concentrated on campaign planning arrived in the middle of the month...On October 6<sup>th</sup>, the planning wizards (SAMS) delivered their proposed battle plan.”<sup>2</sup>

-H. Norman Schwarzkopf

## CHAPTER 2

### THE NEED FOR ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOLS

The basic premise of this paper rests on the belief that Advanced Warfighting Schools are necessary. As logic follows, if Advanced Warfighting Schools are necessary, then a *joint* Advanced Warfighting School is also necessary to address specific planning issues peculiar to a joint environment. This chapter identifies the historical precedent of Advanced Warfighting Schools and provides an overview of the current Service-specific Advanced Warfighting Schools.

The Joint Staff recognizes Advanced Warfighting Schools as either Service-specific or joint (in the case of JAWS) schools which attempt to further develop the minds of the students to become planners or strategists. The Joint staff and the Services design these AWS for a select smaller population of officers and tailor the education for a more thorough application of military science using unique military tools including the staff ride, the kriegspiel or wargame, and the case study.<sup>3</sup> These students are then expected to populate critical planning/strategy billets as key advisors to senior commanders who rely on these officers in-depth understanding of historical parallels and

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<sup>2</sup> H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York, Bantam Books, 1993), 411, 414.

<sup>3</sup> James J. Schneider, “Transforming Advanced Military Education for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Army* (January 2005): 18.

critical analytical ability. They are also expected to produce a leavening influence on other officers across the joint force by their competence and impact on other officers.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of the AWS therefore is not only to train individuals to do certain key jobs better, but to create a multiplier effect in all areas of joint force competence as these officers teach others.<sup>5</sup>

The concept of the Advanced Warfighting School is not new. The Prussians looked to military education after losing the battles of Jena and Auerstedt back in 1806. King Frederick William I identified education as the premiere tool to foster future victories. “Prussian military reformers created a program to educate a small group of officers who could provide a systematic and coherent approach to war.”<sup>6</sup> This revamp of the Prussian military education system “set the standard for military learning well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>7</sup> New approaches followed from the Prussian system to include the staff ride, the kriegspiel or wargame, and the case study. The staff rides “forced leaders to confront the realities of space and time frozen in the geography and terrain of a given theater”, the case study “offered a clinical approach to the study of military art and science, and the kriegspiel “exposed weaknesses in the battlefield and campaign design within the dynamic framework of attack and defense.”<sup>8</sup> In 1924, these methods immigrated to the United States, when an American Officer and WWI veteran studying at

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<sup>4</sup> Huba Wass de Czege, “Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study 13 June 1983,” F-4.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Leonard D. Holder, Jr. and Williamson Murray, “Prospects for Military Education,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 81.

<sup>7</sup> James J. Schneider, “Transforming Advanced Military Education for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Army* (January 2005): 16.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 18.

the University of Berlin, Colonel William Keith Naylor, brought the ideas back to Fort Leavenworth.<sup>9</sup> At Fort Leavenworth, the Army developed a two-year Command and General Staff School that ran for eight years, from 1928 – 1936, when the throughput of officers required in the field led the Army to reduce the course to one-year.<sup>10</sup> The curriculum for those officers selected to attend primarily focused on division level tactics and logistics but also consisted of strategy and war planning. During World War II, the value of this school became apparent as “all of the divisions and corps in the US Army were at some point commanded by 2-year Leavenworth men.”<sup>11</sup>

Similar to the Prussian Jena-Auerstedt battle failures, Vietnam was the American catalyst to reinvest in military education. “It was recognized by the Army’s intellectual leaders like Gens. William E. Depuy, Donn A. Starry, Paul F. Gorman, and Lt. Gen William R. Richardson that military education had to be the centerpiece for any institutional renewal and recovery from the Vietnam debacle.”<sup>12</sup>

To answer the need for an Advanced Warfighting School, the Army developed the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in 1983. This school provided an opportunity for 52 officers to study an additional year at Fort Leavenworth, after the initial year of the Command and General Staff College intermediate level school, to immerse themselves in military theory. The idea came about by a paper developed by then LTC Huba Wass de Czege in 1981 who made the argument for the advanced

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Huba Wass de Czege, “Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study 13 June 1983,” F-2.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., F-3.

<sup>12</sup> James J. Schneider, “Transforming Advanced Military Education for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Army* (January 2005): 18.

school. “The implementation of the Advanced Military Studies Program would enhance the capability of selected officers to think clearly, logically, and rapidly, to conceptualize and innovate, to teach and develop subordinates, to integrate the work of specialists and to create high performing staffs that would anticipate and adapt to change.”

A critical Congressional report elevated the SAMS program to high acclaim. On 21 April 1989, Congress released The Report of the Panel on Military Education for the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, dubbed the Skelton Report. Representative Les Aspen, then Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, selected Representative Ike Skelton to chair a Panel on Military Education with the purpose to “review Department of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act...and assess the ability of the current military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint warfighters, and tacticians.”<sup>13</sup> Overall the panel was not positive of the current state of the military education systems, but highlighted the SAMS program using the Army reference Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP):

“AMSP is a 1-year course in the tactical and operational levels of war for new graduates of the Command and General Staff College who have competed admission to the program through entrance examinations, interviews, past records of performance, and demonstrated motivation. For academic year 1988-89, 46 Army, 4 Air Force, and 2 Marine majors were chosen to attend. Once selected, students participate in specific electives in the last half of their year at the Command and Staff Officers Course, complete the intensive AMSP course, and, after graduation, serve an internship as a division or corps general staff officer.”<sup>14</sup>

The panel found that,

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. Congress. House. 1989. Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., v.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 182.

“SAMS fulfills the Army’s need for officers possessing advanced education in the art and sciences of war at the tactical and operational levels. In this respect it parallels the 2-year courses conducted at Fort Leavenworth in the 1920s and 1930s from which many prominent leaders of World War II graduated including, J. Lawton Collins, Matthew Ridgeway, Mark W. Clark, and Maxwell Taylor.”<sup>15</sup>

Additional notes include that in the long term, the school will provide,

“A pool of tactically and operationally expert general staff officers and potential commanders of major Army formations and joint headquarters, and a group of highly qualified military educators and developers of doctrine.”<sup>16</sup>

The report cemented SAMS within the Army culture and after Desert Storm, the school reached even higher acclaim when General Schwarzkopf’s autobiography was published, ultimately pushing SAMS past the tipping point as a school sought after by the Army’s best and brightest.

With the baseline premise of the necessity of an Advanced Warfighting School, established initially by the Army with SAMS and reinforced by the 1989 Panel of Military Education, the other services soon followed with their own version of Advanced Warfighting Schools. The following chart shows a snapshot comparison of the different Advanced Warfighting Schools and a synopsis of each of these schools is included in this chapter for a later analysis:






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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.



# Advanced Warfighting Schools -Overview-

Service	School	Students	Degree	Level	Obligation
 USA	SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies	107 x O4s Post ILE 87/3/8/2/0/7	Master in Military Arts and Science	Operational / Tactical Div/Corps/Army Component	1 Year Planner
 USN	NOPC Naval Operational Planner Course	30 x O4s ICW ILE + 2 Mos 2/22/2/2/2/0	No Degree	Operational Fleet/ Navy Component	1 Year Planner
 USAF	SAASS School of Advanced Air and Space Studies	39 x O4s Post ILE 1/1/36/1/0/0	Master of Airpower Art and Science	Strategic / Operational Air Force Component/ Joint Staff/ COCOM	Strategy Positions
 USMC	SAW School of Advanced Warfighting	24 x O4s Post ILE 2/1/3/15/1/2	Master of Operational Studies	Operational /Tactical MAGTF / Marine Component	2 Years Planner
 CJCS JPME I & II	JAWS Joint Advanced Warfighting School	41 x (O4-O6) ILE or SLE 11/6/11/3/8/2	M.S. Campaign Planning and Strategy	Strategic/ Operational Joint Staff/COCOM	Joint Assignment 3 Years

Student Breakdown: (Army / Navy / Air Force/ Marines / Inter-Agency / Allied)

## Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)

The mission of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is to “educate officers at the graduate level in military art and science thereby producing leaders with the flexibility of mind to solve complex operational problems in peace, conflict and war.”<sup>17</sup> Founded by then Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, SAMS graduated its first class in 1984. SAMS is designed as an 11-month follow on to the Army's Command and General Staff Officer Course or U.S. Army Service-equivalent ILE. SAMS candidates must be a resident or non-resident staff college graduate from the Army's or a sister services staff college, have Global War on Terrorism related

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<sup>17</sup> United States Army Combined Arms Center, “School of Advanced Military Studies”, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/sams/> (accessed October 15, 2008).

deployment experience, have a high potential for continuing assignments in key planning positions in warfighting units, have an ability to complete a rigorous graduate level academic program in the art and science of war, and have a strong interest in warfighting at the tactical and operational levels. The candidates must provide a letter of recommendation from their most recent senior rater (General Officer letters of recommendation are also welcome to augment the applicant's packet), pass an Advanced Military Studies Entrance Exam, participate in an oral interview, and then be selected by a special Department of the Army centralized SAMS selection board. For AY2008-2009, 107 students attended SAMS. Students were divided into seven seminars of 15 students each, 82 Army active duty, 5 Army National Guard/Reserve, 8 Air Force, 3 Navy, 2 Marines, and seven international officers (UK, Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Australia). Graduates are awarded a Master's Degree in Military Arts and Sciences and also the 6S Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) identified in the Army as an Advanced Military Studies Program graduate.<sup>18</sup> Colonel Stefan Banach, current SAMS director, announced that SAMS will expand to 144 graduates by 2010.<sup>19</sup> Following graduation, officers serve "twelve-month utilization tours in critical battle staff positions within Army division and corps headquarters."<sup>20</sup> SAMS designed the expansion to ensure future graduates will eventually populate planner positions in each of the Army's Brigade

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<sup>18</sup> The Army awards the 6S identifier to Army officers graduating from the following programs: Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), School for Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF).

<sup>19</sup> United States Army Combined Arms Center, "School of Advanced Military Studies Expands Program," <http://usasac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/events/SAMS/expansion> (accessed March 28, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> United States Army Combined Arms Center, "School of Advanced Military Studies," <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/sams/> (accessed October 15, 2008).

Combat Teams and Ranger Regiments as well as the traditional corps and division planner billets.

### **Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW)**

The Marine Corps modeled its AWS, called the School for Advanced Warfighting (SAW) after SAMS. SAW welcomed its first class in 1990 and is tailored to “find the holes in the plans, determine the branches and sequels, and modify the plans as needed.”<sup>21</sup> Marine Corps University describes SAW as an “advanced intermediate school program that concentrates on developing decision-making and complex problem-solving skills at the operational level of war.”<sup>22</sup> The course is designed as an 11-month follow-on school to the existing year long ILE. A rigorous evaluation of past performance, letters of recommendation, essay submission, and a personal interview determine student eligibility. Selected members of the Marine Corps University headed by the SAW director, a Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, convene a board to determine student acceptance. The school annually selects 24 students and limits Marine attendance to 15 students. Normally 2 Army, 3 Air Force, 1 Navy, 2 international, and 1 interagency representative comprise the remaining nine students. Marine Corps University awards graduates with a Master of Operational Studies degree and the Marine Corps provides each graduate a specialized identifier as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) planner. Following graduation SAW graduates can expect to receive a two-year post-

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<sup>21</sup> Colonel John A. Toolan and Charles D. McKenna. “Educating for the Future,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2006, 13.

<sup>22</sup> Marines.mil News. MARADMIN 459/08, “Academic Year 2009-2010 Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) Student Selection,” <http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/MARADMIN459-08.aspx> (accessed February 2, 2009).

graduation assignment aligned with 0505 MOS (MAGTF Planner).<sup>23</sup> The Marine Corps expects MAGTF Planners to lead Operational Planning teams engaged to resolve complex issues on Marine Corps senior staffs. Additionally during later tours, these officers are expected to fill appropriate Joint and Service planning billets requiring complex problem solving skills.

### **Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)**

In 1988, the Air Force initiated the development of its version of an AWS, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Under the auspices of then Air Force Chief of Staff Larry D. Welch, the school graduated its first class in 1992.<sup>24</sup> This Air Force program is designed to “produce strategists—not leaders, not warriors, not even planners.”<sup>25</sup> The school’s charter is to produce the next generation of “strategists”. SAASS is the most selective of Air Force Schools; with only 5% of those eligible to volunteer selected to attend.<sup>26</sup> To become a SAASS student, an officer must graduate from an ILE, be a volunteer, possess a master’s degree from an accredited institution or have an undergraduate degree with a GPA of 2.75 or higher, have less than 16 years total active commissioned service, and be selected by the central selection board held at the

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Air University, SAASS, “SAASS History,” <http://www.au.af.mil/au/saass/history.asp> (Accessed on February 2, 2009).

<sup>25</sup> Stephen D. Chiabotti. “A Deeper Shade of Blue,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 49 (2008): 74. (Dr. Chiabotti was the Vice Commandant of SAASS when he wrote this article)

<sup>26</sup> Air University, SAASS, “Curriculum/Admissions,” <http://www.au.af.mil/au/saass/curriculum.asp> (accessed February 2, 2009).

Air Force Personnel Center.<sup>27</sup> SAASS also admits one member each of the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, Army, Navy, Marines, and three allied foreign nations. Upon conclusion of the 50-week program, graduates receive a Masters of Airpower Art and Science Degree. Graduates do not fill any designated planner positions, but simply “go on to key staff and command positions throughout DOD.”<sup>28</sup> “Since the graduation of its first class, SAASS has produced many of the US Air Force’s most influential airpower strategist and future leaders.”<sup>29</sup>

### **Navy Operational Planner’s Course (NOPC)**

The Navy Operational Planner’s Course began in 1999 and is a three-month follow-on course to the current Naval War College resident ILE designed for Lieutenant Commanders. The school’s mission is to “educate selected Navy and other-Service officers in the skills required for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint and naval operations.”<sup>30</sup> The purpose of the school is to ensure “Joint, Navy component, and numbered fleet commanders” have a population of officers that are both platform-expert and skilled in the planning, execution, and assessment of campaigns and major operations.”<sup>31</sup> Every spring, Naval Personnel Command (NPC) provides the NOPC director a projected slate of all United States Navy officers scheduled to attend the

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Stephen D. Chiabotti. “A Deeper Shade of Blue,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 49 (2008): 76.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Naval War College, Joint Military Operations, “Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC),” <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/Academics/courses/jmo/nop.aspx> (accessed February 2, 2009).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

Navy's ILE, the Naval College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College. The NOPC director then selects primary and alternate candidates from the slate to attend NOPC from across the range of naval communities: Aviation, Surface, Sub-surface, Special Warfare (SEAL), Special Operations (EOD), Intelligence, and Supply. After NPC vets the list for officers that can attend the additional 3-month program and those officers indicate an interest, NOPC selects 22 primary naval officers for attendance. NOPC graduates 30 officers annually, 22 Navy, 2 Army, 2 Marines, 2 Air Force, and 2 Coast Guard.<sup>32</sup>

NOPC graduates receive the same degree as students that graduate the 11-month Navy ILE, a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. The Naval War College does not confer any additional academic degrees for students that graduate the additional 3 months of NOPC. However, the Navy does award NOPC graduates with the JP1 Additional Qualification Designation (AQD). JP1 designates the graduate as a Navy Operational Planner that has yet to complete an operational planner tour. The Navy assigns graduates to either warfare community tours or operational planner billets on Joint, Navy component, and numbered fleet staffs. If a Navy officer is initially assigned to a warfare community tour, that officer is subsequently assigned to an operational planner billet to fulfill a 1-year post-graduation obligation. Non-Navy graduates receive post graduation assignments from their respective services.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Email to author from Mr. Paul Romanski, NOPC Deputy Director, October 31, 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Naval War College, Joint Military Operations, "Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC)," <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/Academics/courses/jmo/nop.aspx> (accessed February 2, 2009).

### **Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF)**

The Army's School of Advanced Military Studies actually consists of two separate programs. The more familiar program that started in 1983 was renamed the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and remains designed for O4s. The second program under SAMS is the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF) designed as an SLE alternative. Started in 1986 with five officers, AOASF is "focused at the operational and strategic levels of war, is a two-year Senior Service College level course that prepares senior officers for colonel-level command and for operational level planning assignments to combatant and service component commands."<sup>34</sup> After the first year, graduates earn the same degree as the AMSP graduates, a Masters degree in Military Arts and Sciences as well as JPME II credit. During the second year, graduates serve as faculty members for the Command and General Staff College with particular service as "seminar leaders in the AMSP."<sup>35</sup> Compared to previous AOASF courses, the current course has the most robust inter-service, interagency and international student body consisting of 8 Army, 1 Navy, and 2 Air Force officers as well as 1 German officer and 1 representative each from both USAID and the FBI.<sup>36</sup> To date there have been a total of 168 graduates from AOASF, each of the Army graduates receives the 6S identifier and aside from the second year as instructors, there are no required outplacement utilization tours.

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<sup>34</sup> United States Army Combined Arms Center, "School of Advanced Military Studies," <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/sams/> (accessed October 15, 2008).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> E-mail to author from Dr. Peter J. Schifferle, Director, Advanced Operational Arts Studies Program of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 23, 2009.

### **Advanced Warfighting School Summary**

Prussian military educational reform laid the bedrock for the groundbreaking efforts of Brigadier General (U.S. Army ret.) Huba Wass de Czege to create the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. In Wass de Czege's 1983 report recommending the implementation of SAMS, he identified possible frictions with the Army community and their acceptance of the program. He stated, "We are a pragmatic Army, education, even in our profession (or especially in our profession), is not highly valued."<sup>37</sup> Thankfully, his and Congressman Skelton's educational vision persevered and now military education is held in much higher regard. Each of the services soon followed the Army's example and now the concept of an Advanced Warfighting School is fully engrained within each of the Service cultures as a necessary program to produce valued military planners. The Services place great value on their respective AWS. Each of the services uses stringent guidance for student selection and most require a follow-on utilization tour after graduation. Some services even go as far as to code the records of their Advanced Warfighting School graduates to ensure the Services identify these officers for future assignments in line with their planning and problem solving credentials.

Although the Services embrace their respective Advanced Warfighting Schools, the Services are only resourced to provide a parochial planning education geared towards specific service purposes, mostly at the operational to the tactical planning levels. The logical next step for Advanced Warfighting Schools is a joint school, stripped of service parochialism, and geared towards the nexus of the operational and strategic planning levels.

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<sup>37</sup> Huba Wass de Czege, "Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study, 1983," F-34.



“Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever, If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized with unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led to fight as one, regardless of service.”<sup>38</sup>

President Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Message to Congress in April 1958

## CHAPTER 3

### THE NEED FOR A JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

Congressman Skelton’s Panel on Military Education identified the need for a joint version of SAMS in 1989,

“The panel was so impressed with the SAMS curriculum it recommended similar schools for the other service and the creation of a joint version of SAMS, “The focus, pedagogy, and faculty are so exceptional at the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) that the panel recommends that they be reviewed for their potential application to the Joint Specialty Officer Course at the Armed Forces Staff College.”<sup>39</sup>

Congressman Skelton later wrote a 1992 article for *Military Review* re-emphasizing the need for a “Joint SAMS” course that would “allow the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and the unified commanders to have a pool of officers well grounded in the planning and conduct of joint operations.”<sup>40</sup> *Military Review* published the article in May 1992, the same month Congressman Skelton chaired hearings before the Military Education Panel on Advanced Military Studies Programs at the Command and Staff

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<sup>38</sup> Alice C. Cole and others, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1949-1978*. (Washington: OSD, 1978): 175.

<sup>39</sup> U.S. Congress. House. 1989. Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 106.

<sup>40</sup> Congressman Ike Skelton, “JPME: Are We There Yet,” *Military Review* (May 1992): 8.

Colleges. Representatives from SAMS, SAASS, and SAW were all in attendance at the hearings and Congressman Skelton's panel asked each of the school representatives a number of questions about size, composition, selection criteria, accreditation, and finally about necessity. Congressman Owen B. Pickett (D, VA) asked, "I am just wondering if you think the best way to carry out the program, the most effective way, is to have three separate programs? Or is there any way that one program could provide the resource that you need in this area of a graduate program following your PME education program?" Each of the school representatives indicated that they were not willing to merge their schools into one joint program. The Army response, provided by the Deputy Commandant, United States Army Command and General Staff College, then Brigadier General William M. Steele captured the essence of each of the Service replies, "There are joint aspects to that education, but the program's purpose is to train Army officers in the skills associated with the development of campaigns; planning and execution. Land combat is the purpose of our course."<sup>41</sup>

In the winter 1993-94 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Brigadier General Steele and Mr. Robert B. Kupiszewski, Chief of the Curriculum Affairs Division at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, identified that a Joint SAMS "should be the next logical step in the education process"<sup>42</sup> The article defends the service-unique Advanced Warfighting Schools and the authors advocate that a Joint SAMS should not focus on the intermediate level and should instead focus on the senior service college

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<sup>41</sup> Comments provided by Brigadier General William M. Steele, Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

<sup>42</sup> William M. Steele and Robert B Kupiszewski, "Joint Education: Where Do We go From Here?," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1993-94): 68.

level for the greatest payoff similar to the SAMS SLE equivalent, the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship.<sup>43</sup> The authors predicted that, “in ten years its (Joint SAMS) impact on theater campaign planning could be just as significant as the intermediate level SAMS courses have been on operational art.”<sup>44</sup>

In 1995, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a report on the Panel of Joint Professional Military Education entitled, “A Strategic Vision for the Professional Military Education of Officers in the Twenty-first Century.” The report recommended further study to “determine whether a need exists for other joint educational opportunities such as an advanced studies program at the Armed Forces Staff College similar in concept to Service advanced studies programs and / or a joint intermediate program to serve as a benchmark for the Intermediate Service Colleges.”<sup>45</sup>

In 2002, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), then General Myers, identified that he wished to “expand and improve Joint Professional Military Education in order to develop trust amongst services, ensure service integration, develop transformational leaders capable of working with other agencies and services, to incorporate observations from recent operations and to educate and train the right person, for the right task, at the right time.”<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>45</sup> Report of the Panel on Joint Professional Military Education of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “A Strategic Vision for the Professional Military Education of Officers in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” March 1995, vi.

<sup>46</sup> Joint Staff J-7 Briefing, *Joint Professional Military Education*, 4 February 2003.

### **Development of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School**

As early as the fall of 2003, CJCS General Myers, issued a tasking to the Joint Staff, J7 to “analyze options for establishment of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). -JFSC Lead.”<sup>47</sup> The identified purpose was to “address need on joint / unified staffs for Officers educated in Joint Operational Art and Campaign Planning.”<sup>48</sup>

The Joint Forces Staff College Commandant, then Major General (USA) Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., a 1987 SAMS graduate, identified Colonel (USA) Frederick R. Kienle, a 1991 SAMS graduate, to lead the development of the first ever Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Major General Quinlan received the tasking to create JAWS soon after his arrival as the Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College in summer of 2003. He knew the creation of JAWS was a sensitive issue with all of the Services since the Service Chiefs would be adverse to applying resources to a new program when they were already concerned with the ongoing war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major General Quinlan and Colonel Kienle identified that the new JAWS course could be created from existing resources by ending one program ongoing at the Joint Forces Staff College and redistributing the resources to develop JAWS. Both leaders felt that the burden on the services would be negligible and the program would move forward fairly quickly. Major General (USA, ret.) Quinlan remembers the first formal presentation to the Service Chiefs as an unpleasant experience. General (USAF, ret.) Myers, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, interrupted the JFSC Commandant on the third slide of the briefing to regain order with the Service Chiefs, who were emotionally charged by the


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<sup>47</sup> Joint Advanced Warfighting School Concept Brief, Powerpoint. 10 March 2004.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

concept, and explained the importance of the JAWS program. To put the matter into context, he explained that quick support from the Service Chiefs for the JAWS program, a program that would cost the Services little in terms of personnel and monetary resources, would be an essential step in the future efforts of the Service Chiefs to gain Congressman Skelton's support of additional military programs.<sup>49</sup> In essence, JAWS would be a quick way for the Services to show Congressional leaders that they continued to support and embrace joint education.

Two of the initial discussion points centering on the creation of JAWS was to identify the focus of JAWS and who should attend. The following slide from the original 2004 JAWS Concept Brief to CJCS answers the first question:



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
As this graphic indicates, the Service specific Advanced Warfighting Schools are geared towards the nexus of the Operational and Tactical levels of planning where the

<sup>49</sup> Phone interview between the author and Major General (ret.) Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr. on 22 January 2009.

<sup>50</sup> JAWS Concept Brief, Powerpoint, 10 March 2004.

primary customer is the Services. National Defense University and the Joint Forces Staff College proposed JAWS would differ by focusing on the nexus of the Strategic and Operational levels of planning and where the primary customer is the Joint Force Commander. Defining JAWS with a different focus would ensure JAWS complemented the existing Service programs.

The next issue was to define who would attend JAWS. The concept brief presented three Courses of Action (COAs): 1) “SLE Only” (O5/O6); 2) “ILE Only” (O4); or 3) Either a SLE or ILE where the education level depends on the student. One of the graphics used in the concept brief identified the distribution of joint billets on the 2004 Joint Duty Assignments List (JDAL). The graphic identifies that by designating JAWS as both an ILE and SLE school, graduates could be assigned to a greater range of joint planning assignments (O4-O6) and would allow the Services greater latitude to identify potential candidates.



Based on the information provided, the CJCS defined JAWS as “not an additive program, a stand alone course that fulfills Professional Military Education requirements, JPME I & II, and not a follow-on to Senior Level or Intermediate Level Education.”<sup>52</sup> This statement meant that JAWS would not be similar to the other Service AWS programs where the typical school is a second year of academics after an initial year of intermediate or senior level training. Officers would attend JAWS as an “in lieu of” course for ILE or SLE and not as a second year of academics. This was a powerful statement since JAWS would then be the first program of its kind to synthesize O4 to O6s in the same classroom, where all students would follow the same curriculum, essentially integrating officers with as few as ten years of service with officers with upwards of twenty-five years of service in the same academic environment.

With the JAWS focus and student population identified and “after months of study and discussion involving the Joint Staff, Services, and members of the military education community,” General Myers announced the establishment of JAWS in April 2004.<sup>53</sup>

To develop the curriculum for JAWS, course planners looked to the curriculums of the existing Advanced Warfighting Schools. After thorough reviews of SAMS, SAASS, SAW, and NOPC curriculums, to include on-site visits, the course planners attempted to take the best techniques and approaches from the existing programs and apply the material to produce the best curriculum engineered to produce expert joint

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Fred Kienle. “The Joint Advanced Warfighter School: Creating World-Class Joint Planners,” Joint Forces Quarterly 41 (2006) 59.

planners. One of these course planners, Dr. Vardell E. Nesmith, Jr., explained that after course approval, he developed the curriculum for one of the three JAWS blocks of instruction, Foundation in History in War. Dr. Nesmith reviewed syllabi from each Service AWS and incorporated the best practices from each into the JAWS curriculum.<sup>54</sup>

Soon after the arrival of the first class first class, JAWS leadership approached Congressman Ike Skelton (D-Mo) to push passage of a House Resolution to modify Title 10 of the U.S. Code and allow the first graduates to obtain degrees upon graduation. Congressman Ike Skelton, in an address to Congress advocating the passage of House Resolution 1490 to award a Masters of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy to the first class of JAWS graduates, spoke of the JAWS program:

“The first class of the JAWS program has given its graduates the tools to be able to create campaign-quality concepts, employ all elements of national power, and succeed as joint force operational and strategic level planners as well as commanders. These graduates will populate the Joint Staff and Combatant commands (sic) with officers expert in the joint planning process and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations.”<sup>55</sup>

Prior to graduating the first class, Major General Quinlan and COL Kienle hosted a first ever Advanced Warfighting School conference at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA on 1 June 2005. JAWS leadership designed the one-day conference, dubbed “The Gathering of Advanced Military Programs”, in which JAWS, SAMS, SAASS, SAW, and NOPC leadership all attended. The purpose of the gathering was designed as a

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<sup>54</sup> Interview between the author and Dr. Vardell Nesmith (Colonel, USA, ret.), JAWS Faculty, 8 JAN 2009.

<sup>55</sup> <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?109:./temp/~109h190wR>



forum for information sharing, as means to solicit potential JAWS improvements, and establish an ongoing consortium.”<sup>56</sup>

From a 1989 Skelton panel recommendation to a CJCS tasker in the fall of 2003, to reality by the fall of 2004, the Joint Advanced Warfighting School graduated its first joint planners to the Joint Staff and COCOMs by summer 2005. Course designers reviewed multiple Service AWS models, engaged with sister AWS leadership for course modification, and even received academic accreditation during the initial course year to ensure JAWS was on par with the existing Advanced Warfighting Schools. JAWS was an academic success from its initial year by granting accredited degrees to its very first graduates.

### **JAWS Today**

The JAWS mission statement captures difference between JAWS and the Service Advanced Warfighting Schools:

“JAWS produces graduates who can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint operational /strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive, and innovative.

JAWS is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands with officers expert in the joint planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations. Students must be capable of synergistically combining existing and emerging capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish operational or strategic objectives.”<sup>57</sup>

Students are expected to be “expert in the joint planning process” and are “envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands.” These missions differ

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<sup>56</sup> “Gathering of Advanced Military Programs” Agenda slide, 1 June 2005, Powerpoint, Provided by Dr. Nesmith.

<sup>57</sup> Joint Forces Staff College, Schools and Academic Programs, “Welcome to the Joint Advanced Warfighting School,” [http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools\\_programs/jaws/overview.asp#mission](http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/overview.asp#mission) (accessed 2 February 2009).

sharply from SAMS, SAASS, SAW and NOPC where service planning and service assignments are the first priority. The Joint Staff and Combatant Commands expect JAWS graduates to immediately assume planning roles without the associated temporary performance degradation associated with a steep learning curve.

As previously explained, JAWS differs from the other Advanced Warfighting Schools in that it enrolls a representative selection of all military services from grades O4 to O6 as well as interagency and multinational personnel. Selected O4s attend JAWS to satisfy both their ILE and receive credit for attendance to an Advanced Warfighting School.<sup>58</sup> Selected O5s and O6s attend JAWS to satisfy both their SLE requirements and receive credit for attendance to an Advanced Warfighting School. All graduates receive Joint Professional Military Education II credit as well, which is now common with all National Defense University graduates and Service specific SLE graduates.

Cynthia A. Watson, a professor of Strategy at the National War College as well as a Associate Dean of Faculty at the Washington, D.C. campus and core course director, included JAWS in her recent work entitled “Military Education, A Reference Handbook.” She describes JAWS in the following excerpt:

“JAWS is designed for a small group of selected Service-proficient officers (O-4 to O6) enroute to planning-related positions on the Joint Staff and in combatant commands. Three interrelated fields of study distinguish the 10-month (sic) curriculum: Foundations in the History and Theory of War, Strategic Foundations, and Operational Art and Campaigning. The school instills decision-making and complex problem solving experience at the strategic and operational level of war with emphasis on adaptive planning processes and techniques. JAWS strives to produce “world-class warfighters”

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<sup>58</sup> According to a memorandum from HQ, AFPC, dated 18 November 2008, “Validation of Advanced Studies Group (ASG) Requirements”, the Air Force does not recognize JAWS as an Advanced Warfighting School. The Air Force only recognizes SAASS, SAMS, SAW, and NOPC. The current SAASS Commandant, Col Gorman, speculates that a reason could be because JAWS does not require ILE as a prerequisite for attendance. USAF Major Alexander Miravite, HQ AFPC Operations Staff Assignments Branch Chief believes the reason is more the result of technical aspects with Air Force Assignment coding.

by conducting graduate-level education and preparing campaign planners to operate in a chaotic environment by teaching them ‘how’ to think.”<sup>59</sup>

Ms. Watson indicates that JAWS graduates are “enroute to planning-related positions on the Joint Staff and in combatant commands.” These officers are expected to act as “campaign planners” by using their “decision-making and complex problem solving experiences at the strategic and operational levels of war.” National Defense University bills JAWS as an essential planning school to support high-level joint military commanders.

The chart show below captures a representative mix of the 41 students that attend JAWS. JAWS leadership divided the students into three representative seminars of about 14 students each. 41 students comprise JAWS Class 5, the class graduating in 2009:

	O4 (ILE)	O5-O6 (SLE)	Total
<b><u>Active Force</u></b>			
Army	4	5	9
Navy		4	4
Air Force	4	5	9
Marine Corps		2	2
<b><u>National Guard/Reserves</u></b>			
Army National Guard		1	1
Army Reserve		1	1
Navy Reserve	2		2
Air National Guard		1	1
Air Force Reserve		1	1
Marine Corps Reserve		1	1
	10 x O4s	21 x O5/O6s	
		Total U.S Military Students = 31	
<b><u>Interagency (8 Total)</u></b>			
U.S. Coast Guard x 1			
Department of Defense x 2			
Department of State x 1			
Department of Homeland Security x 3			
National Security Agency x 1			
<b><u>Multinational (2 Total)</u></b>			
United Kingdom	2		
			41 Total Students

<sup>59</sup> Cynthia A. Watson, *Military Education: A Reference Handbook* (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007): 132.

Each of the services conducts their own advertising and selection processes for potential JAWS candidates. Some services conduct specialized boards for attendance while others simply identify potential candidates and request their attendance. The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff have never established a standardized selection process for JAWS attendance. The issue is far too minor for the Department of Defense to establish a special policy for JAWS selections standards and the Joint Staff does not want to dictate to the Services on who they should select. These same reasons hold true for graduate outplacement. The Department of Defense will not establish a special policy to dictate how graduates should be assigned. In terms of joint assignments, the Joint Staff J1 is concerned only with ensuring the Services meet congressional requirements and is not involved with the actual assignment of personnel. Each Service already maintains their own personnel management directorates that handle personnel assignments to include joint billets.

JAWS is therefore unique in that it is the only Advanced Warfighting School that has zero say in the selection and outplacement of its graduates. The JAWS director, Colonel (Air Force) William T. “Bigfoot” Eliason explained to the AY 2008-2009 JAWS students on their first day of class, “We don’t pick you, we don’t place you, we just teach you.” Although the Joint Staff maintains oversight of the JAWS program, designed to support the Joint Staff and the COCOMs with joint planners, the program rests entirely on the good faith of the Services to identify officers with an aptitude for strategic planning and the same good faith for the Services to assign these trained officers to support a joint headquarters, separating these joint planners from their parent Service for up to four years. Colonel Eliason states, “What is key to this process working well is like

any system, i.e. input is all important. If the Services want high quality Joint Campaign Planners, then they must select not only high quality Service Officers for the school, the Services must send officers who are best assigned on graduation to Joint assignments.”<sup>60</sup>

JAWS designers used a best of breed approach to develop a school to fill a void for trained joint planners. Borrowing and synthesizing from established AWS curriculums and maintaining a dialogue with COCOMs to retain course relevancy, the JAWS program delivers on its academic requirements to produce quality campaign planners to the Joint Staff and COCOMs. The problems facing JAWS are not with the “production” of joint planners, but rather with the Services and the good faith aspect to ensure each Service selects quality officers and are also willing to send these same officers to joint planning positions upon graduation or their subsequent assignment.

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<sup>60</sup> Memorandum to the author from Colonel (USAF) William T. Eliason, Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Subject: Air Force Advanced School Assignment Comments, dated October 2008.

“One idea that merits serious study is the establishment of a Joint SAMS course”

-Congressman Ike Skelton

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **LEGISLATION AND THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT**

Simple logic dictates that if the Services are able to successfully develop and manage Advanced Warfighting Schools then a joint version of an Advanced Warfighting School will produce similar results. The part that complicates simple logic is in terms of authority. Where the Services have the authority to manage their own personnel, that same authority does not exist within the Joint Staff. The Services manage their respective officers even when billeted to a joint assignment, to include schooling. The current environment, established by legislation, precludes the Joint Staff from the hands-on management of selection and outplacement of JAWS graduates or any other assignment.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act defined the roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the limitations. One of the Chairman's functions, as now codified in U.S. Code Title 10, is to formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces. The Joint Staff J7 assists the Chairman in these efforts by formulating Joint Professional Military Education policy, delineated in the OPMEP (Officer Professional Military Education Policy). This OPMEP is the single source guide to the Services to coordinate all aspects of their requirements for Joint Professional Military Education.

Another notable aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is the limitations placed on the Joint Staff. One of those limitations is their inability to execute command authority

over the services, specifically mentioned in U.S. Code Title 10, “Prohibition of Function as Armed Forces General Staff: The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.”<sup>61</sup> In essence, the Joint Staff encourages the Services to follow the policies established by the Joint Staff J7 as formulated in the OPMEP, but there is no command authority that actually compels the services to follow the OPMEP.

The OPMEP,

“defines the objectives and policies of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the schools, colleges, and other educational institutions that make up the military education system of the Armed Forces. Additionally, it defines the fundamental responsibilities of the major participants in the military education arena in achieving desired educational goals. In terms of JPME, the OPMEP provides the policy guidance necessary to meet DoD responsibilities for the development of JQOs.”<sup>62</sup>

DoD policy defined in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1300.19 entitled “DoD Joint Officer Management Program” informs the OPMEP. The Joint Staff references the actual policy delineated in the DoDI and develops the OPMEP to coordinate effectively between the Services and the major participants in the military education arena. There is no guidance in DoDI 1300.19 to specify JAWS selection or outplacement criteria to the Services. This is not an oversight but rather a case where DoD chooses to not dictate a policy. The JAWS military population is such a micro-

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<sup>61</sup> U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5 § 155 (e).

<sup>62</sup> Department of Defense Instruction #1300.19, 31 October 2007 with Change 1, 21 AUG 2008, 31. Joint Qualified Officer (JQO): An officer designated by the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is educated and trained in joint matters and has completed the Level III requirements for “JQO” designation. Replaces legacy term “Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).” Level III identifies an officer that completes JPME II education and who completes a full S-JDA tour. An officer must be in the grade of O-4 or above to be designated as a JQO. As defined in DODI 1300.19, 31 October 2007 with change 1, 21 AUG 2008, 13.

population that a special policy designed solely for JAWS student selection and outplacement is not within the purview of the DoD. Without a DoD policy, the Joint Staff can only provide compelling guidance to the Services within the OPMEP and also via correspondence between the Joint Staff leadership and Service leadership.

There is a DoD policy that manifests itself within the OPMEP and is applicable to JAWS graduates. Since JAWS falls under the Joint Forces Staff College and subsequently under National Defense University (NDU), JAWS graduates must be billeted to a joint assignment upon graduation or on their subsequent tour unless they are already a Joint Qualified Officer, specifically:

“The Military Services must ensure that the following requirements are met by AC (Active Component) officers who graduate from one of the NDU schools (e.g. National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, or the Joint and Combined Warfighting School) for each FY:

1) All JQOs must be assigned to an S-JDA as their next duty assignment following graduation unless waived on a case-by-case basis by the Principal Undersecretary of Defense (Policy and Readiness).

2) More than 50 percent of all non-JQO graduates (for each military Service) attending NDU schools must be assigned to an S-JDA as their next duty assignment following graduation. One half of the officers subject to that requirement (for each Military Service for each school) may be assigned to an S-JDA as their second (rather than first) assignment following graduation, if necessary, for efficient officer management. The Military Service shall coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to document compliance in JDAMIS.”<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 31. S-JDA (Standard Joint Duty Assignment) is an assignment that meets specific tour length requirements (usually 36 months unless granted a waiver for early release due to command requirements) and is included in the JDAL (Joint Duty Assignment List). The JDAL is a list of S-JDAs approved by the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy and Readiness) with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JDAL is maintained by the Joint Staff J-1. JDAMIS (Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System) is the automated management information system data base managed by the Joint Staff, J1, maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center, and updated by the Joint Staff, J1 and the Military Services. JDAMIS supplements existing Military Service manpower and personnel information systems by providing automated files reflecting the approved JDAL and personnel data on officers who are JQOs and other officers who have served or are serving in S-JDA positions or are attending JPME. Current and historical data files in JDAMIS are used to manage, analyze, and oversee the Joint Officer Management Program and are used to prepare the “Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report Annex



The Services refer to this policy guidance as the “50% +1 rule” where the Joint Staff J1 annually reviews the NDU post-graduation assignments to ensure the Services are in compliance. With undefined policy guidance concerning the assignment of JAWs graduates to joint planner positions, the Services are in full compliance when they assign JAWS graduates to non-planner S-JDA billets on their immediate or subsequent follow-on assignment.

The cause of the problem is now evident. Although the intent behind JAWS serves a valid purpose, the environment precludes the successful application of graduates in line with the program’s intent. The Joint Staff identified the potential for outplacement shortfalls while the first class was still in session. In December 2004, Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz (USAF), sent a memorandum to the Service Chiefs to outline the outplacement guidance for the first graduating JAWS class,

“The first 25 JAWS students will graduate in June 2005, and their expertise is needed to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands. These officers will provide expertise vital to the joint community as it fights the War on Terrorism. Although we meet the requirements of law by assigning more than 50 percent of these officers to joint assignments, every effort should be made to allocate each of them to a strategy or campaign-planning billet on the Joint Staff and combatant command staffs. The Joint Staff/J1 will work with your staffs to code and track the assignments of all JAWS graduates.”<sup>64</sup>

The memorandum proved effective in that the Services billeted the largest proportion of the 2005 graduating class to joint planning assignments on the Joint or COCOM staffs

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to the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress.” As defined in DODI 1300.19, 31 October 2007 with change 1, 21 AUG 2008, 11, 20.

<sup>64</sup> Memorandum for Service Chiefs, Subject: Joint Duty Assignment Guidance for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), dated 14 December 2004, signed by Lieutenant General Schwartz

since the schools inception.<sup>65</sup> As noted earlier, successive classes have not fared as well.

A follow-on guidance memorandum included even more detail. In 2007, Admiral Giambastiani, serving as the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, produced a memorandum for the Service Chiefs with the following guidance:

“To ensure JAWS-coded billets are filled, I encourage you to send the maximum number possible of your JAWS graduates to a follow-on joint utilization assignment. Recently we queried the joint and combatant commands and determined that 87 billets require JAWS graduates. Currently in its third year, JAWS has been a resounding success. From its inception, the intent of JAWS was to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands with officers capable of creating campaign-quality concepts, pre- to post-conflict, employing all aspects of national power. However, assignment rates of JAWS graduates to joint commands is trending downward – 72 percent for the 2004-2005 class and 48 percent for the 2005-2006 class. Carefully considers who you send to JAWS so an immediate follow-on joint assignment is attainable.”<sup>66</sup>

In the memorandum, Admiral Giambastiani identified that the Joint Staff and COCOMs coded certain billets within their commands specifically for JAWS graduates. Coding billets is a method for the Joint Staff and COCOMs to assist the Service personnel managers by indicating optimal skill sets are aligned with certain positions. Service personnel managers do not necessarily take billet coding into consideration unless they have more supply than demand, or more officers available for joint billets than they have joint billets to fill. The current JDAL contains more joint billets than the Services are able fill, which negates the advantages of billet coding.

Unfortunately, the 2007 memorandum did not change the downward trend and the

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<sup>65</sup> Data analysis compiled by the author from the outplacement data of each JAWS graduating class since inception.

<sup>66</sup> Memorandum for Service Chiefs, Subject: Assignment of Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) Graduates, dated 26 March 2006, signed by Admiral E.P. Giambastiani.

Services sent even fewer graduates to joint planner assignments. In another attempt to reverse the trend, the current Director, Joint Staff produced another memorandum in late 2008. This memorandum was for the Operations Deputies for each of the respective services that contained the following guidance:

“In accordance with CJCS memorandum ‘Assignment of Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) Graduates to Joint Billets,’ 26 March 2007, Services are encouraged to nominate only officers available for an immediate follow-on joint assignment for JAWS. The intent is to assign 100 percent of JAWS graduates to joint billets upon graduation.”<sup>67</sup>

This memorandum establishes new guidance for the Services in that it encourages them to nominate only officers for JAWS that can immediately assume S-JDA positions upon graduation, limiting the latitude previously enjoyed with the “50%+1 rule.”

Although this memorandum is an acknowledgement that the Services, on the whole, consistently fail to outpace JAWS graduates according to the school’s mission and intent, the memorandum fails to address the need to billet graduates as joint planners. The memorandum also creates guidance inconsistent with current legislation and supporting DoD policy where both do not require the Services to assign 100% of their JAWS graduates to joint billets upon graduation.

All three memorandums identify the intent of JAWS, while the last two emphasize that the Services do not effectively resource the Joint Staff and COCOMS with JAWS graduates. Without any overarching policies to determine how to select officers for JAWS or where to send officers after JAWS, the Joint Staff expects the Services to develop their own selection and outplacement methods. To shape these

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<sup>67</sup> Memorandum for each respective Service Operations Deputy and the NDU President, Subject: Size and Composition of NDU for Academic Year 2009-2010, dated 14 October 2008, signed by Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal.

methods, the Joint Staff continues to produce memorandums as a means to compel the Services to improve JAWS outplacement. Now the complexity of the problem is evident. The Services enjoy much more freedom to support their own service-specific Advanced Warfighting Schools since they enjoy both the executive authority and have ownership of their own personnel management. JAWS, managed by the Joint Staff which does not have executive authority and does not have ownership of their personnel management is completely reliant on the good faith support from each of the Services. Four separate Services develop four separate methods to meet the Joint Staff intent on JAWS student selection and graduate outplacement. The next chapter looks at these methods.

“Without fusion there is confusion.”

- COL Jeffrey L. Bannister (USA)

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **AWS SELECTION AND OUTPLACEMENT: PROCESSES DEFINED BY SERVICE**

The Joint Staff provides annual JAWS allocation guidance to the Services, which typically equates to a total of 25 active duty officers each year, with the remainder of the quotas divided between the National Guard/ Reserves, interagency, and multinational officers. Of the 25 active duty military billets, traditionally nine are reserved for the Army, eight for the Air Force, six for the Navy, and two for the Marine Corps. The Services understand that the Joint Staff’s intent is for them to select officers with an aptitude to excel within the JAWS curriculum and then assign these same officers to joint billets for up to three years after graduation or on their subsequent assignment in accordance with the “50% + 1 rule”. The services are free to define their own selection and outplacement criteria for the micro-population of officers that attend JAWS.

Upon further inspection, the services have vastly different procedures for student selection and outplacement. These procedures not only differ by service, but also differ by officer grade. The Services have different selection and outplacement criteria for students selected to attend JAWS for ILE and for students selected to attend JAWS for SLE. Each of the services manages their O6s differently than their O5s and O4s. Where a Service branch representative or Service detailer manages officer careers in grades O5 and below, the Services manage their O6s as a single group. For the already few officers selected to attend JAWS by each Service, there exists at least two distinct processes

within each Service to manage JAWS graduate outplacement, one for O6s (and O5s identified for promotion to O6) and one for O5 and O4s. This means that a holistic JAWS outplacement approach does not exist at either the Service level or the Joint level.

The rest of this chapter highlights the different Service methods designed to meet the JAWS mission and intent for student selection and graduate outplacement. Notably, some services have centralized their procedures to maximize their compliance with the intentions of the Joint Staff, while others continue a decentralized approach that provides less than optimal results. This chapter compares each Service method for JAWS with the Service method for their own respective Advanced Warfighting School. This comparison shows how the Services place a much greater emphasis on their own AWS and limited emphasis on JAWS. As an example, the Army method for JAWS student selection and graduate outplacement is markedly different than the Army method for SAMS student selection and graduate outplacement. The Services do not have a sense of ownership for JAWS and are only compelled by good faith to meet the programs intent. This comparison theorizes that JAWS is just another “joint” encroachment on Service prerogatives. Why should the Services fully invest in JAWS when their respective Advanced Warfighting Schools serve a similar purpose and do not require their officers to spend time away from their Service in a joint billet?

### **The Army Process**

The Army places exceptional emphasis on its Advanced Warfighting School, SAMS. As previously discussed, officers undergo a rigorous screening process for selection, but also undergo a similar process for outplacement. The Army G3 places special emphasis

on outplacement to ensure each Army division and corps annually receives an adequate apportionment of SAMS graduates. Army corps and division senior leaders visit SAMS prior to graduation to conduct officer interviews and then submit their requests to the Army's Human Resource Command that reviews all requests and balances them with command allocations for final review and approval by the Army G3. The Army is intent on ensuring each SAMS graduate fulfills a role as a division or corps planner. An example of the Army's level of detail when administering their Advanced Military Studies Program guidance is shown below:

FY 08 Tier One, Distribution<sup>68</sup>

- 7 each to USASOC (all enrolled 18-series officers) (7)
- 4 each to deployed or deploying Corps/Division Hqs (36)  
(XVIII Corps, I Corps, 4ID, 1AD, 101AA, 1CD, 1ID, 25ID, 10MTN)
- 3 each to V Corps, III Corps, 2 ID, 3ID, 82ABN (15)
- 3 each to EUSA (3)
- 1 each to SETAF HQ, 3ACR, SOCKOR, INSCOM, CASCOR (5)
- 2 each in AMSP reserve (used to provide additional resources to deploying Division and Corps Headquarters) (2)

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“Tier One” identifies upcoming graduates from the Army's Advanced Military Studies Program as well as upcoming Army graduates from sister-Service Advanced Warfighting Schools except for NOPC and JAWS graduates. With assistance from the Army G1, the Army G3 finalizes and approves pinpoint assignments instructions for each of their annual SAMS graduates.

In contrast to this level of specificity provided to Army SAMS graduates (which includes Army SAASS and SAW graduates), JAWS does not receive the same level of specificity for student selection or graduate outplacement. For JAWS selection, the Army conducts an informal O4 selection board to review files and letters of recommendation of

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<sup>68</sup> Memorandum for Commander, Army Human Resources Command, Subject: Tier one, Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) 2008 Distribution Guidance, dated 14 December 2007, signed by Colonel Gary H. Cheek, Deputy Director of Strategy Plans and Policy.

potential candidates. In interviews with MAJ Jim Dzwonchyk and Mr. Jack Kendell, both from the HRC Leader Development Branch who conduct the informal board to select Army officers to attend JAWS, both indicated that they received no specific guidance for the selection of JAWS students, focusing mainly on ensuring the Army sends different branches (e.g. not all Infantry or Artillery), and are discouraged from sending anyone who is already JQO.<sup>69</sup> For officers slated to attend JAWS as an SLE, the process is even less formal, where candidates do not undergo an informal boarding process or even necessarily make application to attend. The Army fills its requisite quotas by canvassing officers eligible for SLE and determining interest.

The Army provides even less guidance to assignment managers when determining JAWS graduate outplacement. A branch-specific and grade-specific officer manages assignments for Army officers O5 and below. As an example, a single Infantry assignment officer manages the assignments for all Army O4 Infantry officers. Prior to JAWS graduation, the HRC Joint Accounts Section provides each of the branch assignment officers a listing of joint assignments to fill.<sup>70</sup> The Joint Accounts Section works with unit strength managers to disseminate quotas to each of the assignment managers in order to fill available joint billets based on priorities identified by the Army G-3/5/7. Typically branch assignment officers receive quotas to fill branch-specific positions within the joint community but occasionally receive quotas that are not branch specific. Currently, Army G-1 or G-3/5/7 has yet to provide the HRC Joint Assignments

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<sup>69</sup> Personal interview between the author, MAJ Jim Dzwonchyk (HRC Leader Development Branch) and Mr. Jack Kendell (Acting Chief, HRC Leader Development Branch), 21 November 2008.

<sup>70</sup> The Joint Accounts Section manages the accounts for all the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD agencies, and outside DoD agencies. Each account manager serves as the interface between the respective joint commands/agencies and the assignment officers.



section or the branch assignment officers any guidance to stipulate the outplacement of JAWS graduates to joint planner billets.<sup>71</sup> Even though, a number of JDAL positions are coded for JAWS graduates, the Joint Assignments Section will not place emphasis on resourcing these positions without guidance from the Army G-3/5/7.<sup>72</sup> The process for O6s and promotable O5s is different in that all O6s and promotable O5s are managed by a single directorate, Colonels Management Office, but is similar to the O5 and below process in that the Army G-1 and G-3/5/7 have not provided the Colonels Management Office any guidance about JAWS graduate outplacement either.

This Army process is very decentralized, with limited oversight as compared to the Army's AMSP program. A single assignment officer, branch independent, manages all Army SAMS, SAW, and SAASS graduates to ensure the Army monitors graduates even after the initial utilization tour for a possible subsequent planner tour, identified as Tier II.<sup>73</sup> Once Army commanders identify that they require more senior planners, the equivalent of a SAMS branch assignment officer conducts a query of available SAMS, SAASS, and SAW graduates to fill the requirements in demand. The Army codes all Advanced Warfighting School graduates (SAMS, AOASF, SAASS, SAW, NOPC, and JAWS) with a special skill identifier identified as "6S- Advanced Military Studies Program Graduate." Although Army HRC grants JAWS graduates the 6S identifier in their personnel records, JAWS graduates are never managed as "planners" by the SAMS

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<sup>71</sup> Personal interview between the author and LTC Charles A. Walters, Jr., HRC Joint Policy Officer, 21 Nov 2008.

<sup>72</sup> Phone interview between the author and MAJ Carl Lundell, Section Chief for the HRC Joint Assignments Section, 14 January 2009.

<sup>73</sup> Personal interview between the author and LTC Heather Warden, Plans and Policy Branch Chief, Operations and Plans Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, HRC, 21 Nov 2008.

branch manager and are never queried for Tier II assignments.<sup>74</sup> Until the Army G-3/5/7 changes the current policy, JAWS graduates remain an untapped resource for potential senior-level planning assignments.

Beginning with the first JAWS class in 2004, the Army typically selected O4s for ILE who were unable to fulfill the joint assignment utilization immediately following their JAWS graduation. Selected O4s did not fulfill their required Key and Developmental assignments necessary for their promotion to O5. In order to ensure these officers were not at a disadvantage for their next promotion, the Army assigned these officers to their necessary Key and Developmental positions and planned to assign these officers to a subsequent joint billet. To alleviate this shortfall, starting with the JAWS class selected for AY 2008-2009, the Army provided additional JAWS selection guidance to ensure eligible O4s complete their Key and Developmental assignments prior to JAWS attendance: The Army maintains the same guidance for the next JAWS class AY 2009-2010:

“Officers attending JAWS in Norfolk, Virginia must already have served in a Key Developmental position at the major level prior to attendance in 2009. After attending JAWS, officers will be assigned to a Joint Position.”<sup>75</sup>

Although the Army made revisions to their O4 selection process in an attempt to improve their graduate outplacement numbers, only one of the four O4s graduating in summer 2009 are actually slated for a joint billet. The other three O4s received orders to billets within the Army community.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Army MILPER Message # 08-144, Academic Year 2009-2010 Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Sister Service and Foreign School Attendance, dated 4 June 2008.

The Army manages Army O5s by their respective branch managers but most are expected to promote to O6 either during or shortly after graduation. As previously stated, the Colonels Management Office manages Army O6s for future assignments. Four of the five Army officers assigned to JAWS for SLE (AY 08-09) were O6s when selected to attend or will promote to O6 prior to graduation. Only one of these officers is slated to assume a joint billet upon graduation and two are slated for non-joint planner assignments.<sup>76</sup>

The Army will graduate its 47<sup>th</sup> JAWS graduate in summer 2009. The majority of these officers, trained as expert joint planners, remain within the Army force and are never tracked as planners for potential future assignments. The Army developed a new policy to improve JAWS outplacement to joint assignments and given the first opportunity, failed to provide guidance to ensure the successful implementation of the new policy. The Army process to manage JAWS is clearly not the method to emulate, but why?

One theory is that, different from the other Services, the Army already has a career path for officers focused solely on Strategic Plans and Policy (FA59). These officers, identified mid-career, receive specialized education and compete for similar JAWS assignments on the Joint Staff and COCOM staffs. “Current FA59 colonels are disproportionately SAMS-qualified, but they reflect the original core of planners around which the FA59 Career Field originally formed.”<sup>77</sup> 37% of potential FA59 assignments are within Joint or Combined Headquarters where “officers formulate and implement theater

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<sup>76</sup> Data provided from outplacement assignment instructions for each of the four Army officers attending JAWS Class 05 for SLE. (25% are fulfilling joint assignments). Information as of May 15, 2009.

<sup>77</sup> “U.S. Army FA59 Homepage,” [www.fa-59.army.pentagon.mil/Education](http://www.fa-59.army.pentagon.mil/Education) (Accessed 14 January 2009)

strategies, plans, and policies specific to their commands' area of responsibility.”<sup>78</sup> When the Army already maintains a specialized career path for strategic planners, the necessity to manage JAWS graduates is less evident. In simpler terms, JAWS graduates, untrained as FA59s, are irrelevant to the Army.

### **The Navy Process**

The Navy's process for selection and outplacement of NOPC officers is the same as for their selection and outplacement of JAWS students. The current Deputy Director of the Naval Operational Planner Course, Professor Paul Romanski, explains that “We have so few educated and experienced op (sic) planners in the Navy, we must take advantage of all educational opportunities. That is why we identically code all grads of all five schools (SAMS, SAASS, SAW, NOPC, and JAWS).”<sup>79</sup> A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5), the Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Career Management (PERS 4), and the President, Naval War College outlines the Navy process.

In summary, each December, OPNAV N3/N5 solicits nominations from the Fleet for any Intermediate Level officers to attend any of the Advanced Warfighting Schools. OPNAV N3/N5 highlights that Navy graduates from Advanced Warfighting Schools receive an AQD of JP1.<sup>80</sup> Annually in March, PERS4 identifies to the Naval War College

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Email between the author and Dr. Paul Romanski, Deputy Director, NOPC, dated 31 October 2008.

<sup>80</sup> AQD is a Navy acronym that stands for Additional Qualification Designator. JP1 stands for Operational Planner who is a graduate of NOPC, SAMS SAW, SAASS, or JAWS but who has not completed a

Dean of Students all Navy officers who are potential candidates for NOPC and other Advanced Warfighting Schools. The Navy specifies that candidates, for any of the Advanced Warfighting Schools, must show “the potential for upward mobility within their community (particularly Department Head, Executive Officer, and Commanding Officer selection status.)”<sup>81</sup> PERS4 approves nominees for each of the Advanced Warfighting Schools and students attend the course. Upon graduation, PERS4 will “endeavor to assign graduates to fleet and joint staff operational planner billets, taking into consideration such assignments in view of the individuals’ career path.”<sup>82</sup>

The process differs for the Navy’s senior personnel identified to attend JAWS for SLE. Similar to the Army, the process is less centralized and does not consist of a specialized JAWS selection board or even an application process. Of the four Navy officers selected to attend JAWS for AY08-09, all four resided in Norfolk prior to their selection. This may be coincidental, but these same officers were not aware of the JAWS program prior to their selection. The Navy process, at least for O5s and O6s, seems more of a method to stabilize senior officers for a year in Norfolk between Navy assignments. Of these four officers, three will remain in Norfolk for their follow-on assignments, and two were selected for joint assignments (neither as joint planners.)

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permanent station tour assigned as a planner. JP2 stands for an Operational Planner that completed a permanent station tour assigned a planner but who is not a graduate of NOPC, SAMS, SAW, SAASS or JAWS. JP3 is an Operation Planner that completed both the educational and assignment requirements.

<sup>81</sup> MOU, “Execution and overall management of Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) and planner’s billets”, between the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5); the Assistant Commandant, Navy Personnel command for Career Management (PERS4); and the President, Naval War College, signed April 2006.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

### **The Air Force Process**

The Air Force defined their Advanced Warfighting School selection requirements and graduate outplacement policies in a recently published talking paper.<sup>83</sup> The Air Force conducts an annual centralized board to select officers to attend ILE and SLE. The Air Force uses this Intermediate and Senior Service Developmental Education (IDE/SDE) Designation Board (DEDB) to choose students for Air Command and Staff, the Air War College, or sister-service equivalent schools. The Air Force uses a subset of the DEDB, the small schools board to select AWS and JAWS students. Officer senior raters make recommendations for officers to attend JAWS among the options available for the upcoming academic year.

The Air Force AWS outplacement process is a consolidated effort from a number of Air Force directorates, centrally managed by the SAASS Commandant. In late October/November of every year, the Air Force solicits requisitions and stipulates an November/December suspense for units/staffs to submit their requests for ASG graduates for the following Summer assignment cycle. Air Force Personnel Command collects the requisitions, validates them for necessity and vacancy and sends the lists to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans, and Requirements (HAF/A5XS) for review.

HAF/A5Xs rank orders the outplacement assignments into three tiers:

- Tier 1 – Critical strategy and operational planning positions
- Tier 2 – Essential strategy and operational planning positions
- Tier 3 – Other strategy and operational planning positions

In January/February, the Air Force Personnel Command and the SAASS Commandant work to fill requirements by Tier and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff,

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<sup>83</sup> LtCol Wall, Headquarters Air Force Personnel Center, “Talking Paper on Advanced Study Group (ASG) Requirements and Outplacement”, dated 24 September 2008.

Air & Space Operations (HAF/A1) then approves the final ASG outplacements in February. The SAASS Commandant provides all of the senior Air Force representatives at the various ASGs and JAWS a copy of the available assignment spreadsheet. The students receive a copy of the list and are asked to provide their top five choices. The senior Air Force representatives then work together to consolidate the list with the SAASS Commandant in the lead. Once all issues are resolved, the SAASS Commandant submits the list to AF/A1 for staffing within the Pentagon and eventual approval by the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

The Air Force describes their ASG process as “one of DPAOS’s highest-vis, least broken assignment processes.”<sup>84</sup> The Air Force identifies that this process is successful to manage the 50-60 graduates from the combined ASG programs and typically fill Tier 1 assignments to 100%. The Air Force recognizes the value in their ASG investment as identified in a 23 February 2007 memo to AFPC/DPAOS from Lieutenant General Chandler, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations:

ASG graduates represent a substantial investment and a strategic asset for the /Air Force. The service invests additional education to create experts in planning and strategy. Because the schools’ accession processes are voluntary and the curricula both long and rigorous, perceptions of the quality of post-graduation assignments are key to attracting the best qualified applicants. Challenging assignments and the potential for unique career development opportunities drive enrollment and ultimately recoup the significant Air Force investment.”<sup>85</sup>

The SAASS Commandant recognizes that although JAWS is not considered an ASG, he still provides guidance on their outplacement management. The most recent Air

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<sup>84</sup> E-mail between the author and LtCol (USAF) Tate Johnson, one of the developers of the Air Force Advanced Studies Group requirements and outplacement process, September 2008.

<sup>85</sup> Memorandum from AF/A1 to AFPC/DPAOS, 23 February 2007, “Assignment utilization guidance for Advanced Study Group (ASG) Graduates”

Force JAWS graduate outplacement guidance stipulating that “Joint Advanced Study Graduates (Air Force lexicon for Advanced Warfighting School) assignments should be filled first using graduates from JAWS in accordance with the latest Director, Joint Staff memorandum guidance and that the JAWS graduates should be assigned to billets focusing on operational strategy, analysis and planning.”<sup>86</sup> This centralized outplacement process is only geared for Air Force O4s since the other Air Force AWS graduates are also O4s. Air Force O5s and above do not have a centralized process for outplacement but the Air Force works with these officers individually to maximize their outplacement as joint planners.

### **The Marine Corps Process**

The Marine Corps selection and outplacement process operates on a much smaller scale than the other services. The Marine Corps manages their SAW graduates very closely since the school educates only 15 Marines annually, all of which are obligated to serve two-years in one of the Marine Corps’ 50 approved 0505 billets, as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Planners.<sup>87</sup> The Marines view their SAW graduates as an investment. In a recent briefing to define the Marine Corps Operational Planner Billet Distribution Plan, the Marines identified the need to use their Advanced Warfighting School graduates

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<sup>86</sup> Memorandum to A1, Subject: Advanced Study Graduate Assignment Utilization Guidance, dated 3 December 2008, signed Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements.

<sup>87</sup> 0505 billets: defined as “Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planners (O5/O4) complete an Advanced Intermediate Level School preparing them for planning and operational billets on selected Marine Corps staffs to include Marine Expeditionary forces, Marine Component Headquarters, etc. these officers are prepared to lead Operational Planning Teams and conduct actions surrounding complex issues on senior staffs. Additionally, officers with this MOS (military occupational specialty) can be utilized during later tours in their career to fill appropriate Joint and service billets requiring planning and operational expertise and complex problem solving skills.” FY-12.



not just immediately following graduation, but also later in the graduate's career.

“Enforcing SAW payback and re-utilizing post-payback 0505s will provide a healthier pool of assignable officers.”<sup>88</sup> The Marine's identify a long-term need for planners and are looking at expanding the SAW program to increase throughput by four additional officers each year.<sup>89</sup>

The Marine Corps selection and outplacement process for JAWS differs significantly from the process developed for Marines that attend SAW. The Marines have never sent an O4 officer to JAWS. Every Marine selected to attend JAWS were either O5s or O6s. Due to the senior rank of the students, the Marine Corps does not grant Marine JAWS graduates the specialized 0505 coding similar to SAW graduates (also granted to Marine graduates of SAMS, SAASS, and NOPC). The Marines manage each officer individually for both JAWS selection and outplacement and maintain the highest outplacement average to joint billets amongst all the Services.

### **Four Services, Four Methods**

Lack of specific guidance is a common thread between each of the service methods to select and outplace JAWS graduates. Notably, none of the Services ever provided guidance personnel managers to ensure JAWS graduates assumed roles as joint planners after graduation. JAWS student selection standards vary significantly by service and by grade and the Services never view the entire selection process holistically in regards to graduate outplacement. The services clearly understand the value of AWS

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<sup>88</sup> FY-12 Operational Planner Billet Distribution Plan, 25 SEP 08, LtCol Peterson.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

graduates as evidenced by their meticulous methods to manage their own AWS programs, however, given limited guidance and oversight from the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff, Service “good faith” continues to fall short of expectations.

“I’ll take two!”

- General William E. Ward, CDR USAFRICOM<sup>90</sup>

## CHAPTER 6

### JAWS Outplacement Assessment

With each of the respective Services different selection and outplacement processes now defined, this chapter analyzes the outplacement data from the last four years to determine which services were best able to support the JAWS vision and successfully resource the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders with joint planners. This chapter also highlights the current JAWS outplacement trends and includes non-attribution feedback from senior COCOM personnel familiar with JAWS outplacement.

As previously noted, there have been some warning signs along the way that the services were unable or unwilling to support the effective use of JAWS grads as outlined in Joint Staff memorandums to the Service. Another venue to identify concerns is the Military Education Coordination Council. As defined in the OPMEP, the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC),

“serves as an advisory body to the Director, Joint Staff, on education issues, and consists of the MECC Principals and a supporting MECC Working Group. The purpose of the MECC is to address key educational issues of interest to the joint education community, promote cooperation and collaboration among the MECC member institutions and coordinate joint educational initiatives.”<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Comment made by General Ward when JAWS presented him an information briefing during his visit to JFSC in 2007.

<sup>91</sup> CJCSI 1800.01D p. C-1. The MECC Principles are: The Deputy Director, Joint Staff for Military Education, the presidents, commandants, and directors of the joint and Service universities and colleges; and the heads of any other JPME-accredited institutions; and the USJFCOM / J-7.

The MECC Working Group supports the MECC principal's meetings by gathering at least twice annually to prepare papers and briefings.<sup>92</sup> In the Fall 2006 session of the MECC Working Group, after the second JAWS iteration, the committee raised an issue about JAWS outplacement. As annotated under J7 Topical JPME issues in the 21 November 2006 MECC minutes:

“Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) Assignment Issues- Less than 50% of JAWS graduates are going to joint billets. A previous Director, Joint Staff (DJS)-level memorandum to the Services had no effect.

Action Item: Prepare CJCS memorandum to Service Chiefs encouraging a higher joint assignment rate for JAWS graduates. (OPR: J7, OCR: J1)”<sup>93</sup>

The fact that the services were not resourcing the Joint Staff and COCOMs effectively with JAWS graduates was evident via the MECC Working Group and within memorandums from the Joint Staff to the Service Chiefs as early as Fall 2006 after the second graduation. The following section identifies the analysis of the first four JAWS graduating classes and also identifies the steady decline of graduates as Joint Staff or COCOM joint planners. The analysis further identifies which services have procedures that maximize the best support to realizing the intent of the program. Analysis follows to discern how some “customers” (the Joint Staff and COCOMs) are better at acquiring JAWS graduates than others.

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<sup>92</sup> CJCSI 1800.01, the MECC Working Group is comprised of dean's level / O-6 representatives of the MECC Principals. The Chief, Joint Staff / J-7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division chairs the working Group. Current Chief is Colonel (USMC ret.) Jerry Lynes.

<sup>93</sup> Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) Meeting Minutes, 21 November 2006.

**JAWS outplacement data for graduating classes:  
AY2004-AY2005, AY2005-2006, AY2006-2007, and AY 2007-2008**

	TOTALS	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force
JOINT STAFF	10	2	1		7
PACOM	3	1	1		1
EUCOM	2				1
AFRICOM	1			1	
CENTCOM	5	1		2	2
SOUTHCOM					
NORTHCOM	2	1	1		
STRATCOM	1				1
JFCOM	14	2	8	2	2
TRANSCOM	1				1
SOCOM	8		1	2	5
TOTALS	46	7	12	7	20
JOINT (OTHER)	17	10	1	0	6
NOT JOINT	38	16	12	2	8
TOTAL	101	33	25	9	34

This chart identifies the distribution of graduates by service and by assignment location. The Joint Staff and COCOMs are above the black line as a means to depict billets that the Services should fill in line with the JAWS mission. If a service billeted a graduate to a Joint position that was not within the Joint Staff or a COCOM staff, the graduate is categorized as “Joint (Other)” and is depicted below the black line. Examples of “Joint (Other)” assignments include positions within the Defense Intelligence Agency, NATO, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Special Operations Command. The “Joint (Other)” assignments are still valuable to the joint force but do not support the Joint Staff or one of the ten COCOMs directly. The data also does not indicate if the Joint Staff or COCOMs actually employed their billeted JAWS graduates in a role as joint planners commensurate with the JAWS education.


If a service did not billet an officer to joint position, that graduate is categorized as “Not Joint”. This data is current as of December 2008 and incorporates graduates that may now be on a subsequent joint assignment after having fulfilled a service assignment immediately following graduation. A JAWS graduate is only counted once and if the graduate served an initial Service tour and then a subsequent joint tour, the graduate is only included in the numbers for the subsequent joint tour.

The data indicates that the Marine Corps and the Air Force have the highest outplacement success rates among the services with 7 of 9 (78%) for the Marine Corps and 20 of 34 or 58% for the Air Force. The Navy and Army have the least favorable success rates for JAWS outplacement with 48% and 21% respectively. In the conglomerate, the average outplacement of JAWS graduates to the Joint Staff or COCOM staffs is 45%, but this is mostly due to the efforts of the Air Force and Marine Corps.

The next interesting aspect the data depicts is which “customers” benefit the most from Services. Seventy percent of JAWS outplacement is to one of three “customers”: USJFCOM, the Joint Staff, and USSOCOM. One “customer”, USSOUTHCOM, has yet to receive an active-duty JAWS graduates from within the first four iterations. It might be a coincidence that the Navy assigned the preponderance of their graduates to USJFCOM but it is unlikely. This supports the previous assertion that the Navy effectively uses JAWS as a JPME option to ensure families are not uprooted between tours. USJFCOM is popular with the other services as well as a means to keep officers from uprooting their families or shifting children between schools.

There is not enough empirical data to discern why the Air Force dominates positions within the Joint Staff or within USSOCOM. The Special Operations community across all the Services does appear to successfully utilize JAWS as a tool to train and employ joint planners. Officers with a special operations background are seldom considered for positions outside of USSOCOM. Inevitably, USSOCOM has the potential to benefit from every Special Operations officer selected to attend JAWS, rank independent.

Another way to depict the same data is by class year as shown below:



The above graph depicts those graduates that went on to fill joint billets with the Joint Staff or COCOM staffs and does not depict graduates that were billeted to “Joint (Other)” assignments. The number in parenthesis after the percentage indicates the total number of active duty military officers in the course for the given class year. The data

indicates that the highest percentage of graduates went on to fill joint billets within the Joint Staff and COCOMs in the first year after inception. The second year depicts a marked decrease where, in the fall after graduation, the MECC acknowledged concerns about the decreased outplacement trends and recommended a DJSM (Director, Joint staff Memorandum) to address the concerns with the services. As previously identified, the DJSM went out to the service chiefs in late March 2007 with minimal results since only 42% of that graduating class (AY2006-2007) went on to Joint Staff/ COCOM assignments. The most recent graduating class results sparked the latest efforts to revive the JAWS program, as evidenced in the 14 October 2008 DJSM where services were encouraged to select JAWS candidates carefully, ensuring 100% of JAWS graduates are assigned to joint assignments upon graduation starting with academic year 2009-2010 graduating class.

### **COCOM Feedback**

After four graduating classes, comprising a total of 101 active-duty military graduates educated and trained as joint planners, the “customers” bear witness to less than 50% of the JAWS “product”. What is the impact on the COCOMs when they do not receive an annual “supply” of joint planners? Survey results, developed from an informal poll of senior personnel within the J1 and J5 sections of each of the ten COCOMs provide insight on JAWS outplacement. Comments for non-attribution are included below:

(1) “COCOMs need to be the source for all JAWS students with return to Service on subsequent tours. This COCOM is forced/must engage at General Officer/Flag Officer level to ensure requirements are being met. This COCOM is forced to accept non-school planners or even lesser “non-planners” to receive fills. This leaves us critically short AWS planners for current and future years as they encumber the slot throughout the tour



unless we can realign existing vacancies in out years even if MOS and grade is available and the Service supports.”

(2) “ I do not feel that this COCOM receives adequate resourcing of JAWS graduates, particularly with Army officers. In order to cover down on the positions, we are using Reserve Component officers as temporary fills, which our ability to secure funding for Reserve Component officers is quickly diminishing.”

(3) Recommend the equitable apportionment of JAWS graduates to COCOMs and a priority fill on critical deployable billets.

(4) We typically fill our Advanced Warfighting School graduate requirements with non-AWS personnel and recommend the equitable apportionment of graduates per COCOM.

(5) We contract out previous Advanced Warfighting School graduates to fill our joint planner shortfalls.

The selection of comments indicate that the Services do not effectively resource some COCOMs with joint planners forcing the COCOMs to fill joint planner shortfalls in various ways: hiring civilian contractors, activating reservists, or simply filling the position with non-school planners or even worse, non-planners. One of the COCOMs identified the long-term results of filling a position with a non-school planner or non-planner. Unless the COCOM is able to realign positions successfully, the planner position may remain filled until the non-planner finishes their tour in the billet.

This chapter highlighted the current assessment of JAWS outplacement since inception. There is an obvious disparity between the Service’s ability to effectively resource the COCOMs as well as a visible downward trend in graduate outplacement. JFCOM maintains a marked advantage over the other COCOMs due the convenience of ensuring officer family stability, a popular request to avoid moving twice in the same number of years. The other COCOMs do not fair as well for JAWS graduates outplacement, most notably CENTCOM (only 5 JAWS graduates: Army-1, Marines-2,

Air Force-2) that is effectively orchestrating the planning for two wars simultaneously. This year, JAWS will again graduate another 25 active duty military officers and the COCOMS will experience the same joint planner shortfalls since the Service selection and outplacement guidance remains unchanged.

“The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership.”

- Colin Powell

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **Proposed Remedies**

The previous six chapters established the baseline for this paper. Chapter two identified the necessity for Advanced Warfighting Schools and provided the overview of the current schools within the services. Chapter three highlighted the evolution of the Advanced Warfighting School concept to the joint community, discussed the history of JAWS, and identified the intent behind JAWS to support the Joint Staff and COCOM staffs with joint planners. Chapter four explained the authority and limitations of the Joint Staff. This chapter also introduced the documents that define the boundaries within which JAWS must operate and further identified that current policy, in respect to the selection and outplacement of JAWS graduates, is non-directive in nature, to allow the services the most latitude to support the JAWS intent. Chapter five provided a comparison on how the services execute their respective Advanced Warfighting School selection and outplacement policies with how the services developed their own independent procedures to support JAWS. Chapter six provided the empirical data to show the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the current service independent JAWS selection and outplacement policies.

The previous chapters provide the following conclusion: the Services do not effectively resource the Joint Staff or COCOMS with joint planners. This resourcing

deficiency continues to worsen with each graduating class since the program's second iteration. The outplacement trend analysis depicts inequities in JAWS graduate distributions across the Joint Staff and the COCOMs. The Joint Staff is aware of the outplacement shortfalls and initiated plans this year to reverse the downward trend. The chapter introduces these plans and provides some analysis into the planning shortfalls.


Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn (USAF, ret.) was the President of NDU during JAWS development and participated in the concept briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2003 and early 2004. LtGen (ret.) Dunn recalls that during the concept briefings, school development was only part of the solution; the services were still required to identify joint planner billets for the new graduates to assume upon graduation.<sup>94</sup> As previously explained, the Joint Staff and each COCOM are able to code billets on the JDAL for a particular skill set. This allows personnel managers to attempt to match officers with certain skills with positions that require those skills.<sup>95</sup> Since inception, the number of JAWS coded billets has increased to the current level of 105 billets across the Joint Staff and the COCOMs.<sup>96</sup> Below is a graph of the billets as provided by the Joint Staff, J1 in November 2008.

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<sup>94</sup> Phone interview between the author and LtGen (ret.) Michael M. Dunn, NDU President 2003-2006, 27 January 2009.

<sup>95</sup> If the Joint Staff or a COCOM requires a JAWS graduate, they code the JDAL billet S-352. The number of JAWS coded billets has increased from 22 in 2005, to 85 in 2007, and is currently 105 as of December 2008. The initial allocations as presented to the CJCS in 2005 by Major General Quinlan on 8 April 2005 were as follows: STRATCOM (1), TRANSCOM (3), JFCOM (4), SOCOM (2), EUCOM (2), CENTCOM (1), PACOM (3), SOUTHCOM (1), NORTHCOM (1), JOINT STAFF (4),

<sup>96</sup> Email between the author and LtCol (USAF) Darlene M. Roquemore, Joint Officer Management Branch, Joint Staff, J-1, November 2008.



**Shown above are the FY2008 “JAWS Coded-S352” Joint Billets distributions by Service component and by Joint Staff/Unified Command.**

**There are 105 JAWS coded billets this year compared to 87 in 2007.**

The graph depicts the disparity of JAWS coded positions by service and between the COCOMs and Joint Staff. Immediately apparent is the inequitable distribution of billets between the services (not 1/3 Army, 1/3 Air Force, and 1/3 Navy/Marine Corps). Another, less obvious disparity becomes evident when comparing this graph to the current outplacement trends (Chapter 6). For example, the Navy resourced USJFCOM with eight JAWS graduates, but USJFCOM never identified requirements for Navy JAWS coded billets. This evidence supports the theory that the Navy uses JAWS more as convenience for the Service and the officer rather than the advancement of *jointness* in the provision of world-class planners to COCOMs. Another example is where the Joint Staff, USJFCOM, and USSOCOM received 70% of JAWS graduates since inception but the preponderance of JAWS coded billets are within USSTRATCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM. Careful inspection of both graphics reveals a number of additional

disparities that discredit the 105 JAWS coded billets as a method to resource JAWS graduates to the Joint Staff or COCOMs.

USMC Col (ret.) Jerome L. Lynes is the Chief of the Joint Education and Doctrine Division within the Joint Staff, J7. He is intimately familiar with the JAWS program since he has worked within the Joint Staff, J7 directorate since 2003 during the initial plans to create JAWS. In a telephone interview, Mr. Lynes indicated that the JAWS selection and outplacement friction points are managerial in nature, specifically involving the Joint Officer Management process. His staff is currently working with the Joint Staff, J1 to refine the guidance and management of JAWS to better support the original intent of the program. The refinements include redefining the selection requirements for attendance, re-working the JAWS coded billets on the JDAL, and placing more emphasis on the outplacement of graduates to eventually pair graduates with COCOM planner positions.

The first change, already written into a draft OPMEP to be submitted to the CJCS for approval later this year, designates the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) as Senior Level Education, and establishes a 100% outplacement requirement to Joint Planner billets designated on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL).<sup>97</sup> The second change is a holistic refinement of the JDAL to ensure the Joint Staff and COCOMs accurately reflect JAWS coded billets on the JDAL. Mr. Lynes identified that after reviewing the 105 JAWS coded billets, he recognizes that the COCOMs have erroneous expectations with the ability for JAWS to produce joint planners. “The pipeline of joint

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<sup>97</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01D, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), “Draft\_Planner Level”, provided via e-mail from LtCol (USAF) William M Knight, Joint Staff, J7 Joint Education Branch, 11 December 2008.

planner production does not match the needs identified by the COCOMs.”<sup>98</sup> This refinement will considerably reduce the number of JAWS coded positions on the JDAL, relaxing the COCOM expectations, and then over a period of time marry up future graduates with COCOM joint planner assignments.<sup>99</sup>

A potential solution emerges from the following logic train. If JAWS produces 25 military graduates annually and making the assumption that officers fulfill joint assignments for 2 years, the COCOMs and the Joint Staff would need to divide 50 total joint planner billets. The Joint Staff and each COCOM could expect to receive 2 JAWS graduates each year and allowing three additional graduates available annually to reinforce new requirements or unexpected shortfalls. This allows the Joint Staff and each COCOM to identify four JAWS-coded billets. This plans for an equal distribution across the Joint Staff and COCOMs and still allows for a surge of planners to any one COCOM as required. JAWS plans to expand the program in 2010 and would increase the pipeline of planners from 25 to 36 military graduates annually, increasing the JAWS graduates apportioned to each COCOM.<sup>100</sup> The Joint Staff would then need to develop a management method to provide oversight of this plan. This is not a typical function for the Joint Staff, J1 since their purview is not the management of officers, but rather the validation of legislative requirements (50% +1).

The decision to make JAWS a “SLE only” program stems from a desire to support the COCOMs with only experienced leaders, given that they would only receive

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<sup>98</sup> Phone interview between the author and Colonel (USMC, ret.) Jerry Lynes, Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division, Joint Staff, J7, 15 January 2009.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Office interview between the author and Colonel William T. “Bigfoot” Eliason, Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 30 March 2009.

an annual allotment of two officers under the proposed JDAL realignment. Mr. Lynes explained that, in his opinion, COCOMS would be more satisfied with senior O5s and O6s that may actually lead Operational Planning Teams than with O4s that will only be members of an Operational Planning Team on a COCOM Staff. As a witness to the initial tank briefings, Mr. Lynes believes that the original intent behind JAWS was only to create a planner school for senior leaders. During the final approval briefing for JAWS in 2004 with the CJCS, services indicated that they might have difficulty in providing their annual allocations of officers for Senior Level Education. He recalls that a proposal surfaced during one of the sessions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would allow the services to also send officers to JAWS for their Intermediate Level Education as well.<sup>101</sup>


LtGen (USAF, ret.) Dunn recalls that the Army and Air Force were strong supporters for the “ILE only” course of action while the Navy and Marine Corps supported the “SLE only” course of Action. As is often done in the absence of unanimous support for a single course of action, the CJCS approved the combination of both ILE and SLE for JAWS. This was a paradigm shift that meant that select O4s could obtain JPME I and II in a single one-year course as well as achieve credit for attendance to an Advanced Warfighting School. A peer to a an O4 selected for JAWS would need to attend a year of JPME I (at their Service or a sister-Service ILE), a second year at an Advanced Warfighting School (at their Service or a sister- Service) and then attend a 10-week JPME II course at the Joint Forces Staff College to receive to the same education credentials as a JAWS O4.

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<sup>101</sup> Phone interview between the author and LtGen (USAF, ret.) Dunn, 27 January 2009.



The following graph shows the same 105 JAWS coded billets, as provided by the Joint Staff, J1 as distributed by grade. One of the ten COCOMS erroneously coded an O3 billet for a JAWS grad:



As a counter argument to the current Joint Staff plans to modify JAWS, restricting JAWS as “SLE only” course will not necessarily resolve the ability for the Services to resource joint planners to the Joint Staff and COCOMs. Using the graph above as a depiction of where the preponderance of the joint planner positions exist within the COCOMs, the COCOMs require many more O4s and O5s than O6s. Most O5s selected to attend SLE will traditionally be promoted to O6 either in attendance at SLE or shortly after graduation. These same officers are traditionally selected for command opportunities immediately following graduation or shortly thereafter. These assignment considerations severely limit the Joint Staff and COCOM commanders the pool of eligible officers to fill Joint Staff and COCOM joint planners positions. As a service example, senior Army O4s, those that have completed all requirements for their promotion to O5 aside from their ILE, are immediately eligible for 2-3 year follow-on

joint positions before their promotion to O5 or selection for O5 level commands. Starting with the JAWS class graduating in 2009, the Army restricted O4 selections to only those O4s who completed all their requirements for promotion aside from ILE. Currently, all four of these officers are eligible for immediate follow-on joint assignments. If joint guidance were successfully in place to ensure these officers would support the Joint Staff or COCOMs as joint planners, these officers would receive exceptional experiences at the COCOM level, would receive JQO prior to O5 level command, and would be an invaluable asset to the Army as future planners in senior level commands. This current Joint Staff J7 initiative would eliminate this pool of eligible officers as early as the 2011 JAWS graduating class.

Mr. Lynes indicates that if given a choice, the COCOMs would prefer O6 and senior O5 JAWS graduates instead of junior O5 and O4 JAWS graduates. The logic follows that O6s serving at the COCOMs are prime candidates to serve as COCOM Operational Planning Team “leads”. However, the COCOMs not only require the knowledgeable team leaders, they also require knowledgeable team members. A recent Joint Staff J-7 Joint Exercise and Training Division study initiated in 2006 supports this comment. The study identified that there are “approximately 3,900 authorized, approved staff officer billets in all of the Combatant Commands (newly created USAFRICOM was not part of the study).”<sup>102</sup> The study also identified that “49.3% of the authorized HQ billets are for grades O4 and below, the least experienced, least trained and educated personnel on the staff”.<sup>103</sup> Further analysis identified that approximately 14% of the available COCOM

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<sup>102</sup> Dr. Linda Fenty, “Joint Staff Officer Final Report, Prepared for the Joint Staff J7 Joint Exercise and Training Division, April 2008,” 4.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 5.

joint positions were O6 positions and 79% were O4/O5 positions.<sup>104</sup> If the proposed OPMEP is approved in its current form, and JAWS is no longer open to select O4s, as each JAWS class graduates, more O6s will become unemployed JAWS graduate joint planners. Those that are employed at the Joint Staff or COCOM levels will have the pleasure of leading Operational Planning Teams devoid of any O4/O5s with any specific joint planner education on par with JAWS.

A compromise to the “SLE only” initiative currently in deliberation is to only select O4s for JAWS who successfully completed an ILE course prior to arrival. The theory is that this would then ensure that all selected O4s have a thorough understanding of their own Service before they learn how to become expert joint planners. This argument fades when taken in context with the fact the each of the Services also sends select O4s to sister-service and foreign nation ILEs as in lieu of education for their own Service ILE. The Services attempt to send their best and most capable O4s to these sister-service and foreign nation ILEs without having to undergo a year of their parent Service ILE beforehand. In addition, the allure of the JAWS program fades when an O4 must conduct up to three PCS moves in the same number of years to attend the course. Select O4s must PCS from their operational assignment to ILE, from their respective ILE to JAWS, and then from JAWS to the Joint Staff or their COCOM, unless of course the follow-on COCOM assignment is USJFCOM. O4s would ponder the benefits of attending JAWS when they could maintain family stability and attend the AWS already co-located with their ILE. Does this compromise really resolve the problem and provide the Services the good faith necessary to support the Joint Staff and COCOMs with joint

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 6.

planners? In reality, neither the “SLE only” option, nor the ILE compromise get to the root of the problem.

The root of the problem is a lack of ownership. Mr. Lynes posed the following question during my interview, “What is so advanced about JAWS? It has the lowest attendance pre-requisites of the five Advanced Warfighting Schools and there is little to no scrutiny reference assignments post-graduation.” Who defines the selection criteria and who performs the outplacement scrutiny for JAWS? The Services have defined both independently since school initiation. The JAWS faculty has zero input for student selection and limited input for student outplacement. Aside from a few DJSMs to the Service leadership and revised language in a proposed OPMEP, the Joint Staff fails to provide the Services guidance to successfully resource the Joint Staff and COCOMs with joint planners.

This chapter identified and analyzed the current plans from the Joint Staff to address the JAWS joint planner outplacement shortfalls. Revising COCOM expectations on JAWS throughput and developing a plan to provide the Joint Staff and COCOMs an annual JAWS apportionment is a good start to recognizing the problem. However, the solution does not address the application of introducing a new officer management to the Joint Staff, J1. Modification of the current OPMEP to restrict JAWS as an “SLE only” program or the ILE compromise also does not resolve the overall problem. Injecting more O6s into JAWS will not suddenly compel the Services to send JAWS graduates to joint planner billets. The next and final chapter will propose the recommended solutions to correct the errant course of JAWS outplacement and successfully resource the “customers” with the JAWS “product.”

“The primary goal of planning is not the development of elaborate plans that inevitably must be changed; a more enduring goal is the development of planners who can cope with inevitable change”

- unknown

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD**

Only a holistic approach, with full support from the Services to select and outplace JAWS graduates, will ensure skilled joint planners fulfill billets on the Joint Staff and within the COCOMS. Services perceive JAWS as more of joint encroachment on Service prerogatives than as an Advanced Warfighting School designed to produce exceptional joint campaign planners. The heart of the problem is ownership. The Services do not own the method (JAWS program) but do own the endstate (joint planner billets). Success is much easier when one organization, either the Joint Staff or the Services own both the method and the endstate, as evidenced by the success of each of the Service owned and operated AWS programs.

The Joint Staff only owns the method and consequently the JAWS program is an exceptional academic institution modeled from existing AWS successes and specially tailored to prepare officers for joint planner billets within the Joint Staff and the COCOMs. The Joint Staff does not own the endstate and has yet to provide any substantial guidance to the Services in the form of a holistic plan to ensure compliance with the endstate. The Services own the endstate and they decide which officer is assigned to which position, but without any substantial guidance, they continue to act in accordance with their own Service prerogatives.

New Joint Staff initiatives designed to refine JAWS coded joint planner billets within the ten COCOMs are a hopeful start to scoping a potential solution. However, some new Joint Staff initiatives, specifically to limit JAWS as an “SLE only” program, only further cloud the problem and introduce unnecessary frictions. Regardless, these initiatives will not change the fact that the Joint Staff does not own the endstate and cannot compel the Services to see past their own prerogatives with OPMEP revisions or Memorandums directed toward the Service Chiefs. The Services must see and support the vision and endstate wholeheartedly for JAWS to really be successful.

Planning requirements remain extensive within the Joint Force. The recent introduction of Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) to create and revise joint plans rapidly and systematically as well as the introduction of Theater Campaign Plans and an increasing emphasis on interagency planning ensures a continued demand for JAWS graduates in future years. The COCOMs identify their joint planner shortfalls by coding more and more billets annually and in some instances requesting General or Flag Officer involvement to fulfill required joint planner billets. When the billets remain unfilled, the COCOMs resort to alternative methods to fill their shortages by activating reservists, hiring contractors, or assigning non-school planners or non-planners to their joint planner vacancies. These alternative methods are a waste of taxpayer money and DoD efforts and will not result in an overall improvement of joint planning.

The bottom line is that in order to support the COCOMs with an annual fill of skilled joint planners, the Services must fully embrace their roles as a joint provider and also embrace the holistic concept that they must carefully select officers for JAWS schooling and their subsequent outplacement as joint planners. Until the Services truly accept

JAWS as acceptable means to produce joint planners, the joint force will continue to suffer with less unskilled planners producing plans that the Services are destined to support. Is the ability to centralize the execution and throw more resources at the problem the most effective way to resolve an issue that boils down to simple trust and confidence? The Services already have the capacity to oversee their own personnel management systems and with proper guidance from the Joint Staff, can effectively manage the outplacement of JAWS graduates as joint planners. Given a Joint Staff holistic vision and the Service good faith expectations, the negative trend line should reverse. If the trend line does not reverse, forcing the DoD to introduce new policies or requiring the Joint Staff, J1 to change their charter and start managing officers for the Services, the question begs on how Joint our military really is? The Joint Staff should approve and implement the following guidance as a means to readjust the JAWS program, from a holistic sense, ensuring Services support the Joint Staff and COCOMs with future joint planners:

- 1) Realign JAWS coded billets. Reduce the unwieldy 105 COCOM JAWS coded billets to a more apportioned four billets per Joint Staff and each COCOM. The Joint Staff and each of the COCOMs should be authorized two JAWS graduates annually. This breakdown accounts for twenty-two of the pool of twenty-five active duty-officers that attend JAWS annually. Three additional officers are available to support the Joint Staff or COCOMs requiring a surge capacity of planners or to replace officer shortfalls due to family hardship or command requirements.
- 2) Services should look at officer outplacement during officer selection. Given available billets to each of the Services from the outplacement plan above,

officers should receive notice of their Joint Staff/COCOM outplacement billet soon after JAWS selection. This provides students the ability to focus on their applicable region during their JAWS studies, immerse themselves in the applicable regional campaign plans, and potentially tailor their thesis research requirements to support their new regional COCOM. Identifying the outplacement assignment in conjunction with or soon after officer selection provides holistic view to the Services. When the Services understand which outplacement billets are available, they will be able to provide a more informed student selection choice.

- 3) Revise the OPMEP guidance to reflect that JAWS graduates incur a three-year utilization tour (shorter with applicable waivers) as joint planners at either the Joint Staff or on a COCOM staff. Maintain Service flexibility to allow O4s, O5s and O6s to attend JAWS as either an ILE or an SLE education and maintain the original CJCS guidance that JAWS not be a follow-on to SLE or ILE. Modify current OPMEP guidance that fails to indicate that JAWS graduates should be utilized as joint planners.
- 4) Assign JFSC the task of maintaining a JAWS graduate master database. Assign the Services guidance to provide JFSC with graduate assignment information and promotion/command statistics, similar to existing programs in other Service AWS. The Joint Staff J1, J7, JFSC, NDU, and Service representatives would be able to review this data annually to ensure the JAWS program remains on azimuth to support the Joint Staff and COCOMs with future joint planners.



The current rhetoric is that the Services fail to support the COCOMs, the COCOMs fail to properly identify their joint planner requirements, and that the JAWS program fails to provide adequate selection criteria. When everyone else is at fault, leaders should identify that they may actually be cause of the problem. The Joint Staff is the owner of this holistic problem and after the Joint Staff finalizes and implements a proposed plan, taking into account the previously discussed recommendations, and then communicates the plan to the Services, the COCOMs, and to JAWS, ensuring a common vision of the endstate, JAWS may prove a more effective means to an end. Lieutenant General (USA) McChrystal, the current Director, Joint Staff voiced the same views during his visit to the Joint Forces Staff College in February of this year when he defined how to ensure an organization would be successful; define, “Who is in charge, what is the plan, and what does success look like?” To date, this information has yet to be defined for JAWS, but when it finally does, the Services will successfully support the program, ultimately improving planning capacity within the joint community.

Much work remains to adequately resource the force with joint planners. This paper was merely an attempt to validate a pattern of ineffectiveness, define and analyze the problem, and propose recommendations for a solution. Left to the current course, the Services will continue to fail in their efforts to support the Joint Staff and COCOMs with expert joint planners. Knowledge of the problem is a step in the right direction and with some modifications; future JAWS joint planners might be in their critical Joint Staff or COCOM joint planner positions when our Nation needs them most.

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